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Abstract
Recent theories of choice under uncertainty represent ambiguity via multiple priors,
informally interpreted as alternative probabilistic models of the uncertainty that the
decision-maker considers equally plausible. This paper provides a robust behavioral
foundation for this interpretation.
A prior P is deemed “plausible” if (i) preferences over a subset C of acts are
consistent with subjective expected utility (SEU), and (ii) jointly with an appropriate
utility function, P provides the unique SEU representation of preferences over C.
Under appropriate axioms, plausible priors can be elicited from preferences; more-
over, if these axioms hold, (i) preferences are probabilistically sophisticated if and only
if they are SEU, and (ii) under suitable consequentialism and dynamic consistency
axioms, “plausible posteriors” can be derived from plausible priors via Bayes’ rule.
Several well-known decision models are consistent with the axioms proposed here.
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11 Introduction
Multiple priors, i.e. sets of probabilities over relevant states of nature, are a distinguishing
feature of several decision models that depart from subjective expected utility maximization
(SEU) in order to account for perceived ambiguity. Consider for instance the following
version of the Ellsberg [8] experiment: an urn contains 90 balls, of which 30 are red and
60 are green or blue, in unspeciﬁed proportions; subjects are asked to rank bets on the
realizations of a draw from the urn. Denote by r, g and b the possible realizations of
the draw, in obvious notation. The following, typical pattern of preferences suggests that
subjects dislike ambiguity about the relative likelihood of g vs. b: ($10 if r, $0 otherwise)
is strictly preferred to ($10 if g, $0 otherwise), and ($10 if g or b, $0 otherwise) is strictly
preferred to ($10 if r or b, $0 otherwise). While these preferences violate SEU, they are
consistent with the maxmin expected-utility (MEU) decision model ﬁrst axiomatized by
Gilboa and Schmeidler [15]. According to this model, for all “acts” f,g mapping realizations








where u is a utility index and P a set of “priors”. In order to rationalize the above preferences,
assume that u($10) > u($0), and let P be the set of all probability distributions p on {r,g,b}
such that p(r) = 1
3 and 1
6 ≤ p(g) ≤ 1
2 (other choices of priors are possible).
The literature suggests that multiple priors may be interpreted as alternative probabilistic
models of the underlying uncertainty, all equally plausible from the decision-maker’s point
of view. Indeed, a multiplicity of plausible priors is often interpreted as a direct consequence
of ambiguity.1 For conciseness, call this the intuitive interpretation of multiple priors.
This paper provides robust behavioral foundations for this interpretation. To this end,
it identiﬁes a formal notion of “plausible prior” that is both robust to diﬀerent assumptions
about the decision-maker’s attitudes towards ambiguity, and behavioral, i.e. independent of
the functional representation of overall preferences.
Simple, canonical examples of choice in the presence of ambiguity demonstrate the need
for a robust, behavioral notion of “plausible prior”. Return to the urn experiment; consider
a decision-maker, henceforth referred to as “Ann”, whose preferences are as described above:
that is, they are consistent with the MEU model, with priors P. Then, Ann’s preferences are
also consistent with other decision models, featuring diﬀerent sets of priors. For instance,
1 See e.g. Ellsberg [8, p 661]), Gilboa and Schmeidler [15, p. 142] and Schmeidler [30, p. 584]; also cf.
Luce and Raiﬀa [22, pp. 304-305], and Bewley [3].
2consider Hurwicz’ α-maxmin expected utility (α-MEU) model, which prescribes that f be















where Q is a set of priors and α ∈ [0,1].2 If α = 3
4 and Q comprises all probabilities q over
{r,g,b} such that q(r) = 1
3, one obtains an alternative representation of Ann’s preferences.3
The MEU representation of Ann’s preferences might lend some support to the claim
that P is the set of all priors she deems “plausible”. But the 3
4-MEU representation of
Ann’s preferences lends just as much support to the claim that Q is the set of plausible
priors. Absent any formal behavioral criterion, deciding whether P or Q (or neither) is
the “right” set reduces to a choice between alternative functional representations of the
same preferences. But this diminishes the behavioral content and appeal of the intuitive
interpretation of multiple priors. Hence the need for robust behavioral foundations.
Furthermore, the intuitive interpretation of priors is often invoked to suggest that speciﬁc
functional representations of preferences reﬂect distinct attitudes towards ambiguity; for
instance, the maxmin criterion may suggest “extreme pessimism”. If sets of priors are
identiﬁed only by the choice of a speciﬁc functional form, this intuition is questionable. But
if a robust behavioral foundation for the notion of plausible priors is provided, this intuition
can be made rigorous. This provides a secondary motivation for the present paper.
An alternative response to these observations is to regard the intuitive interpretation of
multiple priors simply as a loose and informal “rationale” for certain functional represen-
tations of preferences. But this interpretation has played a central role in motivating both
theoretical and applied research on ambiguity (cf. Footnote 1). Furthermore, it underlies
and facilitates the economic interpretation of several results in applications featuring multi-
ple priors.4 These considerations alone justify an attempt to identify conditions under which
the intuitive interpretation is essentially correct.
To complement the behavioral deﬁnition of plausible priors, this paper proposes an ax-
iomatic framework wherein preferences satisfy several important properties:
2An axiomatization is provided by Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci [12].
3α-MEU-type representations featuring arbitrarily small subsets of P can also be constructed. Moreover,
Section 6.1 in the Online Appendix shows that similar constructions are feasible for all MEU preferences.
4See e.g. Mukerji [26, p. 1209], Epstein and Wang [9, p. 289], Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini [17, p. 878],
Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa and Tallon [4, p.686].
3• The main result of this paper shows that, under the proposed axioms, plausible priors
may be uniquely derived from preferences.
• The axioms I consider are compatible with a variety of known decision models, so the
proposed deﬁnition of plausible prior is indeed robust (cf. Section 2.4). A fortiori, it
is independent of any speciﬁc functional representation of preferences.
• A preference relation that satisﬁes the proposed axioms (“plausible-priors preference”
henceforth) is probabilistically sophisticated in the sense of Machina and Schmeidler
[23] if and only if it is consistent with SEU—and hence admits a single plausible prior.
• The class of plausible-priors preferences is closed under Bayesian updating. Consider an
“unconditional” plausible-priors preference, and a “conditional” preference that is also
characterized by “plausible posteriors”. I identify necessary and suﬃcient consistency
axioms for plausible posteriors to be related to plausible priors via Bayesian updating.
• Finally, the collection of plausible priors fully characterizes preferences: the ordering
of any two acts is fully determined by their expected utilities computed with respect
to each plausible prior (as is the case e.g. for MEU preferences).
The proposed deﬁnition of “plausible priors”.
This paper adopts the Anscombe-Aumann [1] framework (although this is not essential: see
Section 2); thus, acts map states to lotteries over prizes.
I deem a probability measure P over states of nature a plausible prior if there exists a
(suitable) subset C of acts that satisﬁes the following two conditions:
(i) the decision-maker’s preferences among acts in C satisfy the Anscombe-Aumann [1]
axioms (and hence are consistent with SEU); and
(ii) a unique subjective probability can be derived from preferences among acts in C, and
coincides with P.
More succinctly, P is a plausible prior if it uniquely rationalizes the decision-maker’s choices
over a subset of acts. Informally, a prior is deemed plausible if the decision-maker behaves
as if she “actually used it” to rank a suﬃciently rich subset of acts.
The uniqueness requirement in Condition (ii) is relatively demanding, but essential. The
axiomatic framework adopted here ensures that this requirement can be met.
To illustrate the deﬁnition, return to the three-color-urn experiment. The set of priors
that Ann considers plausible is {P1,P2}, where P1(r) = P2(r) = 1
3 and P1(g) = P2(b) = 1
6.
4Let C1 be the set of acts f such that f(b) is weakly preferred to f(g): thus, f ∈ C1 if and only
if u(f(g)) ≤ u(f(b)). Regardless of which representation of Ann’s preferences one chooses
to employ, it is easy to verify that acts in C1 are ranked according to their expected utility
with respect to the probability P1;5 hence, preferences over C1 are consistent with SEU.
Moreover, P1 is the only probability distribution on {r,g,b} that is compatible with Ann’s
preferences over C1.Similar arguments hold for the set C2 of acts f such that f(g) is weakly
preferred to f(b); preferences over C2 uniquely identify the plausible prior P2. Finally, while
there exist other sets C of acts for which Condition (i) holds (a trivial example is the set of
all constant acts), Condition (ii) fails for such sets (for example, any probability distribution
provides a “SEU representation” of preferences over constant acts).
Condition (i) is expressed solely in terms of preferences: whether or not a set C has the re-
quired properties is independent of speciﬁc functional representations of the decision-maker’s
overall preferences. Condition (ii) then establishes the connection between the plausible prior
P and preferences. Thus, the proposed deﬁnition is indeed fully behavioral.
The uniqueness requirement in Condition (ii) is essential in supporting the claim that a
candidate prior is considered plausible regardless of any speciﬁc functional representation of
overall preferences. As noted above, if uniqueness were dropped in Condition (ii), one would
conclude that any prior is “plausible” in the three-color-urn example.6 Further restrictions
might of course be imposed by arbitrarily adopting a speciﬁc representation of Ann’s overall
preferences (e.g. MEU) and insisting that “plausible priors” be elements of the corresponding
set of priors (e.g. P). But these restrictions would be motivated solely by non-behavioral,
functional-form considerations. The uniqueness requirement in Condition (ii) eliminates this
diﬃculty and preserves the behavioral character of the proposed deﬁnition.
Organization of the paper
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the decision framework, formulates
and motivates the axioms, presents the main characterization result, and applies it to known
decision models. Section 3 establishes the equivalence of probabilistic sophistication and
SEU for plausible-priors preferences, and presents the characterization of Bayesian updating.
Section 4 discusses the related literature. All proofs are in the Appendix.
5For the 3
4-MEU representation, consider an act f such that u(f(g)) < u(f(b)); then
argminq∈Q
R
u(f(s))q(ds) = {q1}, where q1(r) = 1




with q2(r) = 1
3, q2(g) = 0. Hence, f is eﬀectively evaluated using the prior 3
4q1 + 1
4q2 = P1.
6For a less extreme example, consider the collection C1∩C2 of acts f such that Ann is indiﬀerent between
f(g) and f(b). Dropping the uniqueness requirement, any probability q such that q(r) = 1
3 could be deemed
a “plausible prior”.
52 Model and Characterization
2.1 Decision-Theoretic Setup
I adopt a slight variant of the Anscombe-Aumann [1] decision framework. Consider a set
of states of nature S, endowed with a σ-algebra Σ, a set X of consequences (prizes), the
set Y of (ﬁnite-support) lotteries on X. For future reference, a charge is a ﬁnitely, but not
necessarily countably additive measure on (S,Σ).
A regularity condition on the σ-algebra Σ is required. I assume that (S,Σ) is a stan-
dard Borel space (cf. Kechris [20], Def. 12.5). That is, there exists a Polish (separable,
completely metrizable) topology T on S such that Σ is the Borel σ-algebra generated by
T . This assumption is unlikely to be restrictive in applications: examples of standard Borel
spaces include all ﬁnite and countable sets, Euclidean n-space Rn and any Borel-measurable
subset thereof, as well as spaces of sample paths in the theory of continuous-time stochastic
processes. The Polish topology T mentioned above plays no role in the axioms.
As in the standard Anscombe-Aumann [1] setup, acts are Σ-measurable maps from S into
Y that are bounded in preference. I assume that preferences are deﬁned over all such acts.
Formally, let 0 be a binary relation on Y , and let L be the collection of all Σ-measurable
maps f : S → Y for which there exist y,y0 ∈ Y such that y 0 f(s) and f(s) 0 y0 for every
s ∈ S. With the usual abuse of notation, denote by y the constant act assigning the lottery
y ∈ Y to each s ∈ S. Finally, denote by  a preference relation on L that extends 0: that
is, for all y,y0 ∈ Y , y  y0 if and only if y 0 y0. Denote the asymmetric and symmetric
parts of  by  and ∼ respectively.
Mixtures of acts are taken pointwise: if f,g ∈ L and α ∈ [0,1], αf + (1 − α)g is the act
assigning the compound lottery αf(s) + (1 − α)g(s) to each state s ∈ S.
Finally, a notion of pointwise convergence for appropriate sequences of acts will be intro-
duced: cf. e.g. Epstein and Zhang [10]. Say that a sequence {fn}n≥1 ⊂ L of acts is uniformly
bounded (“u.b.”) if there exist y,y0 ∈ Y such that, for all s ∈ S and n ≥ 1, y  fn(s)  y0.
Say that the sequence converges in preference to an act f ∈ L (written “fn → f”) if, for
all y ∈ Y with y ≺ f (resp. y  f), there is N ≥ 1 such that n ≥ N implies y ≺ fn (resp.
y  fn). Finally, say that {fn} converges pointwise in preference to f (written “fn
∀s −→ f”)
if, for all s ∈ S, fn(s) → f(s).
It should be emphasized that the Anscombe-Aumann setup is adopted here merely as
a matter of expository convenience. The analysis can be equivalently carried out in the
“fully subjective” framework proposed by Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Siniscalchi
[14]. A brief sketch of their approach is as follows. Let X be a “rich” (e.g. connected,
6separable topological) space of prizes; deﬁne acts as bounded, measurable maps from S to
X. Then, under appropriate assumptions (cf. [14], Preference Assumption A and Remark
4, and references therein), preferences over prizes are represented by a utility function u
such that u(X) is a convex set; moreover, it is possible to deﬁne a “subjective” mixture
operation ⊕ over prizes such that, for all x,x0 ∈ X, and α ∈ [0,1], u(αx ⊕ (1 − α)x0) =
αu(x)+(1−α)u(x0). All axioms stated below can then be restated simply by replacing the
“objective” Anscombe-Aumann mixture operation with subjective mixtures. This yields a
characterization of plausible-priors preferences in a fully subjective environment.
2.2 Axioms and Interpretation
I begin by introducing a set of basic structural axioms (Axioms 1–5 in §2.2.1). Next, the
notion of mixture neutrality is employed to provide a formal deﬁnition of plausible priors
(§2.2.2). Next, I discuss the notion of hedging against ambiguity and deﬁne robust mixture
neutrality (§2.2.3); the latter is then employed to formulate the key axiom for preferences
that admit plausible priors: “No Local Hedging” (Axiom 7 in §2.2.4). Two ﬁnal regularity
conditions (Axioms 8 and 9) are introduced in §2.2.5.
2.2.1 Basic Structural Axioms
The ﬁrst ﬁve axioms will be applied both to the set L of all acts, and to certain subsets of
L. I state them using intentionally vague expressions such as “for all acts f,g...” to alert
the reader to this fact.
Axioms 1–4 appear in Gilboa and Schmeidler [15] and Schmeidler [30], as well as in
“textbook” treatments of the Anscombe-Aumann characterization result; Axiom 5, due to
Gilboa and Schmeidler [15], weakens the standard Independence requirement by imposing
invariance of preferences to mixtures with constant acts only.
Axiom 1 (Weak Order)  is transitive and complete.
Axiom 2 (Non-degeneracy) Not for all acts f,g, f  g.
Axiom 3 (Continuity) For all acts f,g,h such that f  g  h, there exist α,β ∈ (0,1)
such that f  αf + (1 − α)h  g and g  βf + (1 − β)h  h.
Axiom 4 (Monotonicity) For all acts f,g, if f(s)  g(s) for all s ∈ S, then f  g.
Axiom 5 (Constant-act Independence) For all acts f,g, all y ∈ Y , and all α ∈ (0,1):
f  g implies αf + (1 − α)y  αg + (1 − α)y.
72.2.2 Mixture Neutrality and Plausible Priors
Recall that, loosely speaking, a prior P is deemed plausible if (i) preferences satisfy the
Anscombe-Aumann axioms for SEU on a subset C ⊂ L of acts, and (ii) P is the unique
probability that yields a SEU representation of preferences on C. The Anscombe-Aumann
characterization of SEU employs Axioms 1–4, plus the standard Independence axiom in lieu
of Axiom 5. An alternative characterization employs Axioms 1–5 plus an additional property,
Mixture Neutrality. Thus, since this paper considers preferences that satisfy Axioms 1–5,
condition (i) corresponds to the requirement that Mixture Neutrality hold on C.
This subsection formalizes the preceding discussion. First, the following notation and
terminology is convenient. Two acts f and g are mixture-neutral if the decision-maker is
indiﬀerent between any mixture αf +(1−α)g and the corresponding mixture αy+(1−α)y0
of lotteries equivalent to them, i.e. such that y ∼ f and y0 ∼ g. In light of Axiom 5,
C-Independence, this requirement can be formalized as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Mixture-neutral acts) Two acts f,g ∈ L are mixture-neutral (f ' g) if
and only if, for every y ∈ Y , g ∼ y implies αf +(1−α)g ∼ αf +(1−α)y for every α ∈ [0,1].
Axiom 6 (Mixture Neutrality) For all acts f,g, f ' g.
A note on terminology: “mixture neutrality” refers to the property of acts in Def. 2.1;
“Mixture Neutrality” (capital initials) refers to Axiom 6.
The connection between mixture neutrality and ambiguity is discussed at length in the
next subsection. The following proposition conﬁrms that Mixture Neutrality is the key
axiom characterizing SEU preferences in the class of preferences that satisfy Axioms 1–5.
Furthermore, this is the case whether axioms are applied to the entire set L of acts, or to an
appropriate subset thereof. This validates the proposed approach.7
Proposition 2.2 Consider a preference relation  on L and a convex subset C of L that
contains all constant acts. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(1)  satisﬁes Axioms 1-5 and 6 for acts in C.
(2) there exists a probability charge P on (S,Σ), and an aﬃne, cardinally unique function





Proposition 2.2 does not guarantee that the probability charge P in (2) is unique. This
is explicitly required in the formal deﬁnition of plausible prior, which can ﬁnally be stated.
7This result is standard if the set C in the statement below equals L (or the collection of simple acts);
see Remark 5 in Subsection 5.1.5 of the Appendix for a sketch of the argument in the general case.
8Deﬁnition 2.3 (Plausible Prior) Consider a preference relation  that satisﬁes Axioms
1–5 on L. A probability charge P on (S,Σ) is a plausible prior for  if and only if there
exists a convex subset C of L containing all constant acts and such that
(i)  satisﬁes Axiom 6 on C;
(ii) P is the unique charge that provides a SEU representation of  on C.
I emphasize that a plausible prior is not required to be countably additive.
2.2.3 Hedging and Robust Mixture Neutrality
Gilboa and Schmeidler [15] and Schmeidler [30] suggest that an ambiguity-averse (MEU)
decision-maker may violate Mixture Neutrality when contemplating a mixture of two acts
f,g that provides a hedge against perceived ambiguity.8 On the other hand, if (as prescribed
by the deﬁnition of plausible prior) a decision-maker exhibits SEU preferences over a set C
of acts, hedging considerations must be irrelevant for mixtures of acts in C. Thus, loosely
speaking, preferences for which plausible priors can be elicited may exhibit arbitrary “global”
attitudes towards ambiguity, but are “locally” indistinguishable from SEU preferences.
Axiom 7 (“No Local Hedging”), to be introduced in §2.2.4, characterizes this speciﬁc
aspect of preferences, building on the notion of robust mixture neutrality. This subsection
formalizes this notion, and clariﬁes its interpretation by means of examples that will also
prove useful in motivating the axiom.
Notation. All examples in this section employ a ﬁnite state space S = {s1,...,sN} and a
common set of prizes X = {$0,$10}. The set of probability distributions on S is denoted by
∆(S). Also, a lottery y ∈ Y can be identiﬁed with the probability of receiving the prize $10;
similarly, an act f is represented by a tuple (f(s1),...,f(sN)) ∈ [0,1]N, where f(sn) is the
probability of receiving the prize $10 in state sn. Axioms 1–5 imply that the decision-maker
has EU preferences over Y , so such tuples can also be interpreted as utility proﬁles.
A mixture of two acts f,g intuitively provides a hedge against ambiguity if it reduces out-
come variability across ambiguous events relative to both f and g. Example 1 is a particularly
simple instance of this phenomenon; Examples 2 and 3 are possibly more interesting.
8All considerations concerning MEU preferences in this subsection and the next apply to “maxmax EU”,
or 0-MEU, preferences as well (with the appropriate modiﬁcations).
9Example 1 (Ann) This is Ellsberg’s three-color-urn experiment described in the Intro-
duction, restated here for notational uniformity. Ann has MEU preferences, with priors
QA = {q ∈ ∆(S) : p(r) = 1
3, 1
6 ≤ p(g) ≤ 1
2} (denoted P in the Introduction).
The acts fg = (0,1,0) and fb = (0,0,1) exhibit considerable variability across the intu-
itively ambiguous events {g} and {b}; however, they vary in opposite, hence complementary
directions—fg(g)  fg(b) and fb(g) ≺ fb(b). Consequently, their strict mixtures display less
variability across {g} and {b} than both fg and fb: indeed, 1
2fg + 1
2fb is constant on {g,b}.
Consistently with this hedging intuition, fg 6' fb.
On the other hand, two acts f,f0 are mixture-neutral if and only if f(g)  f(b) and
f0(g)  f0(b), or f(g)  f(b) and f0(g)  f0(b). Mixtures of such acts will display more
outcome variability across the intuitively ambiguous events g and b than one of the acts f,f0,
and less variability than the other.9
Example 2 (Bob) (cf. Klibanoﬀ [21], Ex. 1). A ball is drawn from an urn containing an
equal, but unspeciﬁed number of red and blue balls, and an unspeciﬁed number of green balls;
thus, S = {r,g,b}. Bob has MEU preferences, with priors QB = {q ∈ ∆(S) : p(r) = p(b)}.
Thus, the relative likelihood of {r} vs. {b} is unambiguous.
Let f = (.2,.3,.5) and f0 = (.1,.4,.6). Then f and f0 are comonotonic,10 but the
expected outcomes they yield on the ambiguous events {r,b} and {g} vary in complementary
directions. Hence, their mixtures reduce or eliminate expected-outcome variability across
{r,b} and {g}. Consistently with this hedging intuition, f 6' f0.





2f0(b)  f0(g), or 1
2f(r) + 1
2f(b)  f(g) and 1
2f0(r) + 1
2f0(b)  f0(g); mixtures
of such acts do not reduce expected outcome variability across the ambiguous events {r,b}
and {g} relative to both f and f0, and hence provide no hedging opportunities.
While mixture neutrality correctly reﬂects absence of hedging opportunities for MEU
preferences, this is not the case for more general preferences that satisfy Axioms 1–5. The
following example demonstrates this.
Example 3 (Chloe) Consider draws from a four-color urn of unknown composition; let
S = {r,g,b,w}, where w is for “white”. Chloe has α-MEU preferences (cf. the Introduction),
with α = 3
4 and set of priors QC = ∆(S). These preferences satisfy Axioms 1–5.
9For such acts, |[γf(g) + (1 − γ)f0(g)] − [γf(b) − (1 − γ)f0(b)]| = γ|f(g) − f(b)| + (1 − γ)|f0(g) − f0(b)|.
10Two acts f,f0 are comonotonic if there do not exist s,s0 ∈ S such that f(s)  f(s0) and f0(s) ≺ f0(s0):
see Schmeidler [30]. It may be shown that Axioms 1-5 and Mixture Neutrality restricted to comonotonic















. The sets of outcomes delivered by f and f0
on the intuitively ambiguous events11 {r,g} and {b,w} vary in complementary directions,
so their mixtures reduce or eliminate the variability of sets of outcomes across these events.










, yields an outcome in the set {3
4, 7
12} if
either {r,g} or {b,w} obtains. Thus, by analogy with Examples 1 and 2, it seems at least
conceivable that a mixture of f and g might have some hedging value; yet, f ' g.
On the other hand, the mixture neutrality of f and g is not “robust”. Consider for
instance a small perturbation of f, such as the act f =
 





.12 Mixtures of f and
g also exhibit less variability across the events {r,g} and {b,w} than do f or g. Consistently
with this intuition, it may be veriﬁed that f 6' g.
Example 3 indicates that non-MEU preferences allow for knife-edge, non-robust instances
of mixture-neutrality for acts that may conceivably provide hedging opportunities.13 Appro-
priate “perturbations” of the acts under consideration may then be used to ﬁlter out such
non-robust instances of mixture neutrality, and hence identify pairs of acts that genuinely
provide no hedging opportunities. The deﬁnition of robust mixture neutrality reﬂects these
considerations by identifying suitable perturbations.
For the present purposes, a perturbation of an act h0 is a mixture (1 − γ)h0 + γh, where
h ∈ L is arbitrary and γ ∈ (0,1) should be thought of as “small”.14 Two acts f,g ∈ L are
deemed robustly mixture-neutral if every small but arbitrary perturbation of every strict
mixture of f and g is mixture-neutral with both f and g:
Deﬁnition 2.4 (Robustly mixture-neutral acts) Two acts f,g ∈ L are robustly mixture-
neutral (written f ≈ g) if and only if for every h ∈ L and h0 ∈ {λf + (1 − λ)g : λ ∈ (0,1)},
there exists γ ∈ (0,1) such that
γh + (1 − γ)h0 ' f, γh + (1 − γ)h0 ' g.
To motivate Def. 2.4, note ﬁrst that f ≈ g implies f ' g (cf. Lemma 5.2, Part 5 in
the Appendix). Moreover, for the MEU preferences in Examples 1 and 2, f ' g implies
11 These events are ambiguous according to the deﬁnition provided by Ghirardato and Marinacci [13]. The
example can be slightly modiﬁed so as to ensure that they are also ambiguous according to the deﬁnition
put forth by Epstein and Zhang [10].
12Formally, the restriction  ∈ (0, 1
3) is required; informally,  can be “arbitrarily small”.
13The choice of f and g in Example 3 is “knife-edge” also in a diﬀerent, but related sense. It can be shown
that, for any α-MEU preference with α 6= 3
4, f and g are not mixture-neutral.
14The speciﬁc mixture-based notion of perturbation I adopt is suﬃcient for the present purposes, but it is
not crucial to the analysis. One might consider more general perturbations, at the expense of introducing
additional deﬁnitions and notation (e.g. a notion of “neighborhood” of the act h0).
11f ≈ g: for such MEU preferences, mixture neutrality is always robust.15 This suggests that
the relation ≈ is the appropriate counterpart of ' for non-MEU preferences. The main
characterization result will further strengthen this interpretation.
Turn now to the speciﬁc requirements of Def. 2.4. Assume ﬁrst that λ is close to 1.16
A perturbation γh + (1 − γ)h0 of h0 = λf + (1 − λ)g can then be viewed as a “two-stage”
perturbation of f. The ﬁrst stage entails perturbing f in the direction of g, and is necessary
to ensure that no opportunity for hedging is introduced by perturbations, when none exist.
For concreteness, in Example 1, 0 ' fg, and indeed 0 ≈ fg; this is in accordance with the
intuition that mixtures with constant acts do not provide any hedge against ambiguity.17
However, (1−γ)(0)+γfb 6' fg for any positive value of γ; intuitively, perturbing the constant
act 0 in the direction of fb introduces spurious hedging opportunities relative to fg. On the
other hand, for every strict mixture h0 = λ(0) + (1 − λ)fg there exists a (suﬃciently small)
γ ∈ (0,1) such that [γfb + (1 − γ)h0](g)  [γfb + (1 − γ)h0](b), and hence the two-stage
perturbation [γfb + (1 − γ)h0](b) does not provide hedging opportunities relative to fg.18
Perturbations of h0 = λf +(1−λ)g for intermediate values of λ need also be considered
in order to ensure that the relation ≈ can be viewed as extending ' to non-MEU preferences.
Observe that, by Def. 2.1, if f ' g, then for all strict mixtures λf + (1 − λ)g, it is the case
that λf +(1−λ)g ' f and λf +(1−λ)g ' g. Allowing for arbitrary λ ∈ (0,1) ensures that
robust mixture neutrality also satisﬁes this property.
2.2.4 The Key Axiom
As noted above, the two key axiom proposed in this paper characterizes preferences that are
“locally” consistent with SEU, but are otherwise arbitrary.
Examples 1 and 2 suggest that the conditions identifying (robustly) mixture-neutral
acts can be quite diﬀerent for diﬀerent preferences.19 However, there is some commonality
among all three examples: if, for two acts f and f0, the outcomes f(s) and f0(s) are nearly
indiﬀerent, i.e. “close”, in every state s, then f,f0 are (robustly) mixture-neutral.
This is in accordance with the hedging intuition. For simplicity, assume that the state
15It can be shown that MEU preferences satisfy this property whenever the representing set of priors is
the weak∗-closed, convex hull of a ﬁnite or countable collection of points.
16Analogous arguments hold for λ close to 0.
17Recall that this is the motivation for Axiom 5.
18Note also that the act f in Example 3 can be viewed as a “two-stage” perturbation of f: ﬁrst, perturb f
by considering the mixture (1−)f +g ≡ h0, for  > 0 “small”; then, perturb h by considering the mixture
1
2h + 1












19Similar conditions can be provided for Example 3.
12space S is ﬁnite. If two acts f,f0 are suﬃciently “close” to each other state-by-state, then
they vary in the same direction across all disjoint events E,F ⊂ S, including potentially
ambiguous events: if f yields better outcomes at states s ∈ E than at states s ∈ F (or,
as in Examples 2 and 3 respectively, a better expected outcome, or better sets of outcomes,
on E than on F) , then so does f0. Mixtures of f and f0 therefore exhibit more variability
across E and F than one of the acts f,f0, and less than the other; hence, they provide no
hedging opportunities. Therefore, if arbitrarily close acts are not (robustly) mixture-neutral,
this must be a consequence of considerations other than the simple variability-reduction, or
hedging intuition. The axiom I propose thus requires a degree of consistency with the latter.
In the simple setting of Examples 1–3, “closeness” is measured by the absolute diﬀer-
ence between probabilities. Axiom 7 generalizes this by considering pointwise convergent
sequences of acts.
Axiom 7 (No Local Hedging) If {fn}n≥1 ⊂ L is u.b. and, for some f ∈ L, fn
∀s −→ f,
then there exists N ≥ 1 such that n ≥ N implies fn ≈ f.
The preceding discussion is subject to two qualiﬁcations. First, Axiom 7 allows for the
possibility that two acts f,f0 fail to be (robustly) mixture-neutral, even though they vary
in the same direction across all disjoint ambiguous events; however, it does rule out the
possibility that all acts f0 that vary in the same direction as f across ambiguous events be
perceived as providing hedging opportunities relative to f. Second, the discussion applies
verbatim to inﬁnite state spaces, if there are ﬁnitely many ambiguous events. More generally,
Axiom 7 intuitively suggests that, for two acts f,f0 to violate robust mixture neutrality, they
must display “suﬃciently complementary” patterns of variability across “suﬃciently many”
ambiguous events. For further discussion, see Section 4.1.
2.2.5 Additional Regularity Conditions
Axioms 1–5 and 7 should be viewed as capturing the key behavioral properties of prefer-
ences that admit plausible priors. It turns out that two additional regularity conditions are
required. The ﬁrst is only needed if the state space is inﬁnite; the second is automatically
satisﬁed in certain speciﬁc models of choice (see below), but must be explicitly stated if one
wishes to identify plausible priors without imposing restrictions on ambiguity attitudes.
The ﬁrst regularity condition requires a form of pointwise continuity for uniformly bounded
sequences of acts; if S is ﬁnite, it is of course implied by Axiom 3.20
20Versions of this axiom appear in characterizations of SEU and probabilistically sophisticated preferences
with countably additive probabilities: see e.g. Epstein and Zhang [10], as well as references therein.
13Axiom 8 (Uniformly Bounded Continuity) If {fn}n≥1 ⊂ L is u.b. and, for some act
f ∈ L, fn
∀s −→ f, then fn → f.
Axiom 8 plays a key role in Subsection 5.1.4 of the Appendix. It also implies that
plausible priors are countably additive, but this should be considered a side eﬀect. The
restriction to uniformly bounded sequences of acts is of course essential: even SEU preferences
characterized by countably additive probabilities may fail to be continuous with respect to
sequences of (bounded) acts that are not uniformly bounded.
To motivate Axiom 9, observe ﬁrst that, for arbitrary MEU preferences, mixture neu-
trality satisﬁes the following “consistency” property:
Remark 1 Let  be a MEU preference relation. For any triple of acts f,g,h, if f ' g and
h ' γf + (1 − γ)g for some γ ∈ (0,1), then
αf + (1 − α)h ' βg + (1 − β)h.
for all α,β ∈ [0,1].21 22
This property ensures that the no-hedging intuition applies to distinct pairs of mixture-
neutral acts in a consistent manner, as the following example suggests.
Example 4 (Dave) S = {rr,rb,br,bb}, representing draws from two urns containing red
and blue balls, in unknown proportions. Dave has MEU preferences, with priors QD = ∆(S).
Let f = (1,1,0,0), g = (1,0,1,0), and h = (0,1,1,0). It may be veriﬁed that f ' g.
Since f and g yield the same outcomes in states rr and bb, their mixtures cannot provide a
hedge against the ambiguity of {rr} and {bb}. Such mixtures can reduce outcome variability
across the ambiguous events {rb} vs. {br}, but this turns out to be irrelevant for Dave.








. In particular, mixtures of these acts do not
provide a hedge against the ambiguity of {rr} and {bb}, because h is constant on {rr,bb}.23
It follows that mixtures of f and h, as well as mixtures of g and h, all exhibit the same
pattern of variability across {rr} and {bb}. This suggests that αf +(1−α)h ' βg+(1−β)h
for all α,β ∈ [0,1]. It may be veriﬁed that such acts are indeed mixture-neutral.
In other words, f ' g and γf + (1 − γ)g ' h suggest that f, g and h exhibit a common
pattern of variability across at least one pair of ambiguous events, and that furthermore
21The cases α = β = 0 and α = β = 1 are uninteresting.
22The restriction γ ∈ (0,1) is essential. In Example 1, fg ' (0, 1
4, 1
4) and (0, 1
4, 1
4) ' fb, but fg 6' fb.
23That is: outcome variability is of course reduced relative to 1
2f + 1
2g, but not relative to h, so there is no
hedging. Analogously, mixing any act ¯ f with a constant act y reduces variability relative to ¯ f, but ¯ f ' y.
14this variability is crucial to the evaluation of these acts.24 The mixtures αf + (1 − α)h and
βg + (1 − β)h also display this pattern of variability, so mixtures of these composite acts
should not provide hedging opportunities. Remark 1 conﬁrms that, indeed, they do not.
As was discussed above, I suggest that robust mixture neutrality be viewed as the ap-
propriate extension of mixture neutrality to non-MEU preferences. However, the preceding
axioms are not suﬃcient to ensure that the former will satisfy a property analogous to Re-
mark 1. Axiom 9 explicitly requires that such a property hold, and hence reinforces the
suggested interpretation of robust mixture neutrality.
Axiom 9 (Hedging Consistency) For all acts f,g,h ∈ L: if f ≈ g and, for some γ ∈
(0,1), h ≈ γf + (1 − γ)g, then αf + (1 − α)h ≈ βg + (1 − β)h for all α,β ∈ [0,1].
2.3 The Main Result
Recall that the deﬁnition of plausible priors involves sets of acts restricted to which prefer-
ences satisfy Axiom 6, Mixture Neutrality. The utility proﬁles of acts in any such collection
is a subset of the space B(S,Σ) of bounded, Σ-measurable real functions on S. Theorem 2.6
indicates that, under the axioms proposed here, B(S,Σ) can be covered by (the conic hull of)
such sets of utility proﬁles; furthermore, the latter satisfy speciﬁc algebraic and topological
properties. For expository convenience, these properties are listed in Deﬁnition 2.5.
Deﬁnition 2.5 A collection C of subsets of B(S,Σ) is a proper covering if
S
{C : C ∈ C} =
B(S,Σ), elements of C are not nested, and:
(1) every element C ∈ C is a convex cone with non-empty interior that contains the constant
functions γ1S, for γ ∈ R;
(2) for all distinct C,C0 ∈ C: if c ∈ C ∩C0 and a,b ∈ C are such that αa+(1−α)b = c for
some α ∈ (0,1), then a,b ∈ C0;25 and
(3) if a uniformly bounded sequence {an}n≥1 in B(S,Σ) converges pointwise to some a ∈
B(S,Σ), then there exists N ≥ 1 such that, for all n ≥ N, there exists Cn ∈ C with
an,a ∈ Cn.
24Mixtures of f,g and h may eliminate variability across other events, but this does not lead to departures
from mixture neutrality. So, the residual variability must be a crucial concern for the decision-maker.
25That is, C ∩ C0 is an extremal subset of C: see e.g. Holmes [18], §2.C.
15Property (1) can be seen to correspond closely to Part (i) in the deﬁnition of a plausible
prior; furthermore, nonemptiness of the interior ensures uniqueness of the elicited probability.
Property (2) states that intersections of distinct cones are “small”: in particular, it implies
that they have empty interior. Finally, if C is ﬁnite, Property (3) can be replaced by the
assumption that each set C ∈ C is closed with respect to uniformly bounded pointwise limits.
The main result of this paper can ﬁnally be stated; N denotes a generic index set.
Theorem 2.6 Let (S,Σ) be a standard Borel space, and consider a preference relation 
on L. The following statements are equivalent:
(1)  satisﬁes Axioms 1–5, 7, and 8–9;
(2) There exist an aﬃne function u : Y → R, a ﬁnite or countable proper covering
{Cn : n ∈ N} and a corresponding collection of probability measures {Pn : n ∈ N} such




adPm, and furthermore, for all f,g ∈ L:
(i) if u ◦ f ∈ Cn and u ◦ g ∈ Cm for some n,m ∈ N, then
f  g ⇐⇒
Z
u ◦ f dPn ≥
Z
u ◦ g dPm; (1)
(ii) if f ≈ g, then there exists n ∈ N such that u ◦ f,u ◦ g ∈ Cn; and
(iii) if
R
u ◦ f dPn ≥
R
u ◦ g dPn for all n ∈ N, then f  g.
In (2), u is unique up to positive aﬃne transformations, {Cn} is unique, and for every
n ∈ N, Pn is the unique probability charge such that (i) holds for acts in {f : u ◦ f ∈ Cn}.
Henceforth, I will employ the expression plausible-priors preference to indicate a binary
relation  on L for which (2) in Theorem 2.6 holds.
Preferences in Examples 1–4 all satisfy the axioms in (1). In the MEU examples (Ex. 1,
2 and 4), the probabilities {Pn} in (2), i.e. the plausible priors, turn out to coincide with
the priors indicated above. In Example 3, which employs α-MEU preferences, the set of




In light of Theorem 2.6, a proper covering may be viewed as a collection of “menus”; the
decision-maker has standard SEU preferences when comparing items on the same menu (i.e.
“locally”), but diﬀerent considerations may guide her choices from diﬀerent menus.27
26In Example 3, the 3
4-MEU criterion associates the value 3
4
R
u◦f dδs + 1
4
R
u◦f dδs0 to acts f such that
f(s) ≺ f(s00) ≺ f(s0) for all s00 6∈ {s,s0}. This clearly corresponds to
R
u ◦ f d[3
4δs + 1
4δs0].
27I owe this interpretation to Mark Machina.
16I now discuss Theorem 2.6 by listing a number of corollaries. First of all, each (countably
additive) probability measure Pn appearing in (2) is a plausible prior; in particular, note
that every Pn is uniquely determined by preferences over acts whose utility proﬁle lies in Cn.
Furthermore, no other charge on (S,Σ) can be a plausible prior for :
Corollary 2.7 Under the equivalent conditions of Theorem 2.6, the collection of plausible
priors for  is given by {Pn : n ∈ N} in (2).
As noted after Def. 2.5, each set Cn has non-empty interior. This is not a necessary conse-
quence of the deﬁnition of a plausible prior. On the other hand, it ensures that the plausible
priors in Theorem 2.6 can be interpreted as the outcome of an elicitation “procedure”.
Fix n ≥ 1, let g ∈ L be such that u ◦ g is an interior point of Cn, and choose prizes
x,x0 ∈ X such that x  x0. For every E ∈ Σ, let bE be the binary act that yields prize x
at states s ∈ E, and prize x0 elsewhere. Since u ◦ g is in the interior of Cn, for α ∈ (0,1)
suﬃciently close to 1, u◦[αg +(1−α)bE] ∈ Cn; moreover, there exists πE ∈ [0,1] such that
αg + (1 − α)bE ∼ αg + (1 − α)[πEx + (1 − πE)x
0].
Simple calculations then show that πE = Pn(E).
The “procedure” just described should be viewed merely as a thought experiment.28 It
does suggest, however, a sense in which plausible priors obtained in Theorem 2.6 exhibit
familiar properties of standard SEU priors, even beyond the requirements of Deﬁnition 2.3.
Condition (ii) in Part (2) conﬁrms that, under the axioms proposed here, robust mixture
neutrality reﬂects a strong notion of absence of hedging opportunities: if f ≈ g, then f and g
belong to a set of acts over which preferences are consistent with SEU. Indeed, the converse
of (ii) is implied by (i)-(iii). Thus:
Corollary 2.8 Under the equivalent conditions of Theorem 2.6, for all f,g ∈ L, f ≈ g if
and only if u ◦ f, u ◦ g ∈ Cn for some n ≥ 1.
Part (ii) of Theorem 2.6 also implies that the elements of the proper covering {Cn} have
an important maximality property:
Corollary 2.9 Suppose the equivalent conditions of Theorem 2.6 hold, and let C ⊂ L be
such that, for all f,g ∈ C, f ≈ g. Then there exists n ≥ 1 such that {u ◦ f : f ∈ C} ⊂ Cn.
28In practice, identifying points in the interior of each cone Cn seems non-trivial.
17In particular, the domain of each plausible prior Pn cannot be extended beyond Cn.
Finally, Condition (iii) implies that preferences are fully determined by plausible priors.
To clarify this point, it is useful to construct a functional representation of overall preferences
on the basis of results in Theorem 2.6. Let R = {(
R
adPn)n∈N : a ∈ B(S,Σ)} be the
collection of (possibly countably inﬁnite) vectors of integrals of functions with respect to
each plausible prior obtained in Theorem 2.6. If N is ﬁnite, R is a vector subspace of RN
that includes the diagonal {(γ,...,γ) : γ ∈ R}.29 Then deﬁne a map V : R → R by









where n∗ is such that a ∈ Cn∗. By (iii) in Theorem 2.6, V is well-deﬁned and unique.30
The map V can be thought of as “selecting” an index n∗ as a function of the vector
ϕ = (ϕn)n∈N ∈ R, and associating to ϕ the value ϕn∗. In Examples 1 and 2, N = {1,2} and
V (ϕ) = minn ϕn. In Example 3, N = {1,...,12}, and the functional V can be explicitly
described by enumerating the possible orderings of the components of the vector ϕ.
The above claim can now be made precise. For all acts f,g ∈ L, f  g if and only if
V ((
R
u◦f dPn)n∈N) ≥ V ((
R
u◦g dPn)n∈N), so the ordering of f and g is entirely determined
by the vectors (
R
u◦f dPn)n∈N and (
R
u◦g dPn)n∈N. As a function of these alone, V selects
indices nf and ng such that f  g if and only if
R
u ◦ f dPnf ≥
R
u ◦ g dPng. Thus, plausible
priors fully determine preferences.
The functional V can be interpreted as the decision-maker’s “elicited” choice criterion.
Since plausible priors are identiﬁed without assuming any speciﬁc functional representation of
overall preferences, V arguably provides a behaviorally accurate description of the decision-
maker’s attitudes towards ambiguity.
2.4 Examples of Plausible-Priors Preferences
This section provides simple suﬃcient conditions for MEU (or 0-MEU), α-MEU and CEU
preferences to permit the elicitation of plausible priors. Conceptually, these examples demon-
strate that Axiom 7 does not restrict the decision-maker’s attitudes towards ambiguity, and
hence is compatible with a variety of decision models. From a practical standpoint, the
29If N = N, it can be shown that R is a vector subspace of B(N,2N) that includes all constant functions.
30Additional functional properties of V can be easily established. V is normalized, i.e. V (1N) = 1;
monotonic: ϕn ≥ ψn for all n implies V (ϕ) ≥ V (ψ); c-linear: for all α,β ∈ R with α ≥ 0, and ϕ ∈ R,
V (αϕ + β) = αV (ϕ) + β. Finally, if {ϕk} is a sequence in R such that ϕk
n → ϕn for all n ∈ N, and
α ≤ ϕk
n ≤ β for some α,β ∈ R and all n ∈ N, k ≥ 1, then V (ϕk) → V (ϕ).
18results in this subsection may be directly invoked in applications to ensure that the intuitive
interpretation of priors is behaviorally sound.
Unless otherwise noted, no cardinality restriction is imposed on the state space S. For
simplicity, I focus on preferences that admit a ﬁnite collection of plausible priors. These are
characterized by the following additional axiom (see Online Appendix, §6.2.2):
Axiom 10 If {fn}n≥1 ⊂ L is u.b. and, for some f ∈ L, fn
∀s −→ f, then there exists a
subsequence {fnk}k≥1 such that, for all k,k0 ≥ 1, fnk ≈ fnk0.
Recall that Axiom 7 only requires that elements of the sequence {fn} be robustly mixture-
neutral with f, for n large. Intuitively, Axiom 10 additionally requires that, as elements of
the sequence {fn} get closer and closer in preference at each state, a “cluster” of elements
become mutually robustly mixture-neutral.
Given a functional representation of preferences, Condition (ii) in Theorem 2.6 is typically
harder to verify than Conditions (i) or (iii). The following result (Proposition 6.2 in the
Online Appendix) considerably simpliﬁes this task, and is also of independent interest.
Proposition 2.10 Let {Cn}n≥1 be a proper covering and {Pn}n≥1 the corresponding col-
lection of probabilities. Assume that (i) and (iii) in Theorem 2.6 hold. Finally, let f,g ∈ L
be such that f ≈ g and, for some λ,µ ∈ [0,1] with λ < µ, and an appropriate index n,
u(λf + (1 − λ)g),u(µf + (1 − µ)g) ∈ Cn.
Then, for all α ∈ [0,1], there exists nα such that u(αf + (1 − α)g) ∈ Cnα and Pnα = Pn.
Loosely speaking, if f ≈ g and the “line segment” {αf + (1 − α)g} has a non-trivial
intersection with some Cn, then every mixture of f and g is evaluated using the prior Pn—
even if it does not belong to Cn. By way of contrast, if Condition (ii) also holds, f ≈ g
implies u(αf + (1 − α)g) ∈ Cn for all α.
An analogous property holds for MEU preferences: if f ' g and preferences are repre-
sented by a set Q of priors on (S,Σ), then there is Q ∈ Q such that Q ∈ argminQ0∈Q
R
u(αf+
(1 − α)g)dQ0 for all α ∈ [0,1]. This reconﬁrms that robust mixture neutrality is the appro-
priate generalization of mixture neutrality to non-MEU preferences.
2.4.1 Maxmin and Maxmax EU preferences
MEU preferences serve as a model for the main axioms for plausible-priors preferences. Thus,
unsurprisingly, a rich (indeed, dense) subset of such preferences satisﬁes the axioms proposed
here. Section 4.1 provides an example of a MEU preference that does not.
19Remark 2 Let  be a 0-MEU or 1-MEU preference, and let P be the corresponding
set of priors. If P is the weak∗-closed, convex hull of ﬁnitely many probability measures
{P1,...,PN}, then  satisﬁes the plausible-priors axioms, and the corresponding set of pri-
ors is precisely {P1,...,PN}.
For ﬁnite state spaces, I am unaware of examples of MEU preferences employing count-
ably many plausible priors. On the other hand, examples for inﬁnite state spaces are easy
to construct (e.g. consider S = N and the set of (degenerate) priors {δ{n} : n ∈ N}).
2.4.2 Generic α-MEU Preferences
Consider now preferences consistent with Hurwicz’ α-criterion. I provide a simple suﬃcient
condition that relies on Proposition 2.10 and a genericity assumption.
Remark 3 Let  be an α-MEU preference, and let Q be the corresponding set of pri-
ors. Assume that Q is the weak∗-closed, convex hull of ﬁnitely many probability measures
{Q1,...,QN}, and let M ⊂ {1,...,M}2 be deﬁned by
M =

(n,m) : {Qn} = argmin
k
Z
u ◦ f dQk, {Qm} = argmax
k
Z
u ◦ f dQk for some f ∈ L

.
If, for all distinct pairs (n,m),(n0,m0) ∈ M, αQn + (1 − α)Qm 6= αQn0 + (1 − α)Qm0,
then  satisﬁes the plausible-priors axioms, and the corresponding set of priors is precisely
{αQn + (1 − α)Qm : (n,m) ∈ M}.
A sketch of the argument is as follows. For all (n,m) ∈ M, let Cn,m be the set of
functions in B(S,Σ) whose expectation is minimized by Qn and maximized by Qm. The
collection of such sets is a proper covering (see the Online Appendix), and functions in Cn,m
are evaluated using the measure Pn,m = αQn + (1 − α)Qm. Thus, Condition (i) in Theorem
2.6 holds trivially, and Condition (iii) is easily veriﬁed (cf. the argument following Lemma
5.12 in the Appendix). To verify Condition (ii), suppose that f ≈ g and let α and (n,m) be
such that u ◦ f,u ◦ [αf + (1 − α)g] ∈ Cn,m. If α = 0, there is nothing to prove; otherwise,
Proposition 2.10 implies that there exists (n0,m0) ∈ M such that Pn0,m0 = Pn,m; but this
violates the genericity assumption in Remark 3. Thus, Condition (ii) holds.
2.4.3 Generic CEU preferences in ﬁnite state spaces
CEU preferences (Schmeidler [30]) can also satisfy the plausible-priors axioms, provided the
state space S is ﬁnite. Let v : 2S → [0,1] be a capacity on S: that is, A ⊂ B ⊂ S imply
20v(A) ≤ v(B), and v(∅) = 0 = 1 − v(S). Assume that S = {s1,...,sM}, and let ΠM be the
set of all permutations (π1,...,πM) of {1,...,M}.
Again, I employ Proposition 2.10 and genericity. In particular, note that the collections of
maximal cones of comonotonic functions is a proper covering, and the proofs that Conditions
(ii) and (iii) in Theorem 2.6 hold are analogous to the ones sketched above. Thus:
Remark 4 Assume that S is ﬁnite and let Σ = 2S. Let  be a CEU preference over L,
and, for all permutations π ∈ ΠM, let Pπ be the probability distribution deﬁned by
Pπ(sπi) = v({sπ1,...,sπi}) − v({sπ1,...,sπi−1}).
If, for all π,π0 ∈ ΠM, Pπ 6= Pπ0, then  satisﬁes the axioms proposed here, and {Pπ : π ∈ ΠM}
is the collection of plausible priors for .
3 Probabilistic Sophistication and Updating
3.1 Probabilistic Sophistication
As is well-known, preferences that admit a non-degenerate “multiple-priors” representation
may nevertheless be probabilistically sophisticated in the sense of Machina and Schmeidler
[23].31 Whether or not such preferences should be treated as revealing a concern for ambiguity
is a somewhat contentious issue; see e.g. e.g. Epstein and Zhang [10], §8.3, and Ghirardato
and Marinacci [13], §6.3 for a discussion of alternative viewpoints.
Fortunately, this issue does not arise if the axioms proposed here hold: a probabilistically
sophisticated plausible-priors preference is consistent with SEU.
To clarify, observe ﬁrst that, within the Anscombe-Aumann decision framework, Axioms
1–5 imply that preferences over lotteries are consistent with EU maximization. The preceding
statement is thus trivially true in such circumstances.32 This section is concerned with
establishing this property in a “fully subjective” setup where lotteries are not available, and
hence cannot be employed to pin down the decision-maker’s risk preferences.
I adopt the decision setup discussed at the end of §2.1, wherein a characterization of
plausible-priors preferences can be provided. Thus, (i) acts are maps from S to a topologically
31The “canonical” example is a CEU preference  represented by a capacity ν that is a convex transfor-
mation of a probability measure (e.g. S = [0,1] and ν(E) = [λ(E)]2 for all Borel sets E, where λ denotes
Lebesgue measure). Since ν is convex,  also admits a MEU representation.
32Loosely speaking, a probabilistically-sophisticated decision-maker ranks acts by “reducing” them to
lotteries, and then ordering the latter by means of some preference functional V (see [24] for details). In the
Anscombe-Aumann setup, Axioms 1–5 imply that V is the EU functional.
21rich, but otherwise arbitrary set of prizes X, and (ii) regularity assumptions on preferences
guarantee the existence of a convex-ranged utility function u on X.
Probabilistic sophistication can be deﬁned as a restriction on preferences in order to
economize on notation. An act f ∈ L is deemed simple if {x : ∃s ∈ S, f(s) = x} is ﬁnite.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A preference relation  is probabilistically sophisticated (with respect to µ)
if there exists a probability charge µ on (S,Σ) such that, for all simple acts f,g ∈ L,
h
∀x ∈ X, µ({s : f(s)  x}) ≤ µ({s : g(s)  x})
i
⇒ f  g,
with strict preference if strict inequality holds for at least one x∗ ∈ X.
A probabilistically sophisticated decision-maker thus ranks acts in accordance with ﬁrst-
order stochastic dominance with respect to a charge µ. In particular, she is indiﬀerent among
acts that induce the same distribution over prizes given µ.33 Furthermore, the probability µ
represents her “qualitative beliefs”, as revealed by preferences over binary acts.
Although Def. 3.1 does not require this, the axiomatization of probabilistic sophistication
provided by Machina and Schmeidler [23] delivers a convex-ranged probability charge µ: that
is, for every E ∈ Σ and α ∈ [0,1], there exists F ∈ Σ such that F ⊂ E and µ(F) = αµ(E).
On the other hand, µ need not be a measure; however, for plausible-priors preferences, it
will be (due to Axiom 8; cf. also Epstein and Zhang [10]).
Proposition 3.2 Let  be a plausible-priors preference in the decision setting under con-
sideration. If  is probabilistically sophisticated with respect to a convex-ranged probability
charge µ, then µ is the only plausible prior for . Consequently,  is a SEU preference.
Apart from resolving issues related to diﬀerences in the deﬁnition of “ambiguity”, Propo-
sition 3.2 is conceptually relevant to the interpretation of plausible priors. It is never the
case that a decision-maker who perceives no ambiguity, but has non-EU risk preferences, is
(incorrectly) deemed to consider more than one prior “plausible”: if her preferences admit a
plausible-priors representation as per (2) in Theorem 2.6, then either she is not probabilis-
tically sophisticated, or she is a SEU decision-maker.34
33Def. 3.1 does not explicitly impose “mixture continuity” (cf. [23], pp. 754-755), because it is immaterial
to the proof of Proposition 3.2. Also, under Axioms 1–8, Def. 3.1 implies that preferences among non-simple
acts are also consistent with FOSD, but this is not used in the proof of Proposition 3.2.
34I emphasize that the assumption that µ is convex-ranged is essential for Proposition 3.2 to hold. However,
to the best of my knowledge, the only characterization of probabilistically sophisticated preferences that does
not deliver a convex-ranged charge is [24], which utilizes objective lotteries. As noted above, the result is
trivially true under Axioms 1–5 in that setup.
223.2 Updating
The theory presented so far accommodates static decision problems only. This section ex-
tends it to dynamic choice problems, adapting analogous axioms and results for MEU pref-
erences in Siniscalchi [32].
Consider an event E ∈ Σ; interpret it as information the decision-maker may receive in the
dynamic context under consideration.35 Correspondingly, consider a conditional preference
relation E on the set L of acts; the ranking f E g is to be interpreted as stating that the
decision-maker would prefer f to g, were she to learn that E has occurred.
This section provides an axiomatic connection between conditional and unconditional
preferences. It shows that, if the unconditional and conditional preference relations satisfy
the axioms of the previous section, plus two joint consistency requirements, then:
• the (unique) set of “plausible posteriors” representing the updated preference is related
to the set of “plausible priors” via Bayesian updating;
• conditional preferences are determined by a unique updating rule.
As is the case for SEU preferences, updating is well-deﬁned only for a subclass of events.
The following deﬁnition indicates the relevant restriction. The intuition is that the event E
under consideration “matters”.
Deﬁnition 3.3 An event E ∈ Σ is non-null iﬀ, for all pairs of acts f,g ∈ L such that
f(s) ∼ g(s) for all s ∈ S \ E and f(s)  g(s) for all s ∈ E, f  g.
Additional notation will be needed. Given any pair of acts f,g ∈ L, let
fEg(s) =

f(s) if s ∈ E;
g(s) if s / ∈ E.
Turn now to the key behavioral restrictions, stated as assumptions regarding an arbitrary
conditional preference E and the unconditional preference .
First, preferences conditional upon the event E are not aﬀected by outcomes at states
outside E. This is a version of consequentialism.
Axiom 11 (Consequentialism) For every pair of acts f,h ∈ L: f ∼E fEh.
35For instance, E may correspond to the information that a given node in a decision tree has been reached.
23Second, a weakening of the standard dynamic consistency axiom is imposed. Its inter-
pretation (and the relationship with other consistency axioms) is discussed at length in [32].
Loosely speaking, Axiom 12 imposes consistency in situations where hedging considerations
are arguably less likely to lead to preference reversals.
Axiom 12 (Dynamic c-Consistency) For every act f ∈ L and outcome y ∈ Y :
f E y, f(s)  y ∀s ∈ Ec ⇒ f  y;
f E y, f(s)  y ∀s ∈ Ec ⇒ f  y.
Moreover, if the preference conditional on E is strict, then so is the unconditional preference.
Observe that the dominance conditions f(s)  y and f(s)  y are stated in terms of the
unconditional preference. It is clear that one could separately assume that conditional and
unconditional preferences agree on Y , and state the dominance conditions in terms of the
conditional preference Ec. Note also that strict preference conditional on the event E is
required to imply strict unconditional preference.
The main result follows.
Theorem 3.4 Consider an event E ∈ Σ. Suppose the preferences  and E satisfy Axioms
1–5, 7, and 8–9, and assume that E is non-null. Let  be represented by u, {Cn : n ∈ N}
and {Pn : n ∈ N} as in Theorem 2.6; similarly, let E be represented by uE, {CE
k : k ∈ K}
and {P E
k : k ∈ K}. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) E satisﬁes Axiom 11, and , E jointly satisfy Axiom 12;
(2) uE is a positive aﬃne transformation of u, and for every k ∈ K, there exists nk ∈ N
such that P E




adPnk(·|E) =⇒ ∀m s.t. 1Ea + 1Ecγ ∈ Cm,
Z
[1Ea + 1Ecγ]dPm = γ. (3)
A few remarks are in order. First, the Theorem ensures that every plausible-priors
preference relation can be uniquely updated in a manner consistent with Axioms 11 and 12,
so as to ensure that the the resulting conditional preference has an analogous “plausible-
posteriors” representation. Conceptually, this is perhaps the most important part of Theorem
3.4, because it indicates that the class of plausible-priors preferences is closed under updating.
Second, every posterior P E
k is obtained by updating one of the priors in {Pn : n ∈ N}.
However, not every plausible prior generates a plausible posterior. Intuitively, this reﬂects
the possibility that, upon acquiring new information, certain ex-ante plausible probabilistic
models of the underlying uncertainty might have to be discarded.
24Third, the condition in Eq. (3) characterizes the posterior evaluation of a function in
terms of the prior evaluation of a related function. To clarify, deﬁne the“evaluation” of a
function a ∈ B(S,Σ) by I(a) =
R
adPm whenever a ∈ Cm; as a consequence of Theorem
2.6, this deﬁnition is well-posed. The “posterior evaluation” of a function can be similarly
deﬁned. As is shown in the Appendix, Part (2) in Theorem 3.4 implies that the converse
implication in Eq. (3) also holds. Thus, the latter equation states that γ is the posterior
evaluation of a if and only if γ solves the equation
γ = I(1Ea + 1Ecγ).
A similar “ﬁxed point” condition has been used as a deﬁnition of posterior preferences in
order to derive Bayesian updating for sets of priors (cf. Jaﬀray [19], Pires [28] and references
therein). On the other hand, Theorem 3.4 shows that Eq. (3) is a result of consequentialism
and consistency axioms on prior and posterior preferences.
4 Discussion
4.1 Preferences without Plausible Priors
This subsection discusses an example of MEU preferences for which plausible priors cannot be
elicited, because the uniqueness requirement in Def. 2.3 cannot be satisﬁed. This highlights
important features of plausible-priors preferences. Notation and assumptions about outcomes
are as in the examples of Section 2.
Example 5 (Edith) Let S = {s1,s2,s3} and consider a MEU decision-maker, Edith, with
priors QE = {q ∈ ∆(S) :
P
i=1,2,3[q(si)− 1
3]2 ≤ ε2} for ε ∈ (0, 1 √
6]. Graphically, QE is a circle
of radius ε in the simplex in R3, centered at the uniform distribution on S.
Two acts f,g satisfy f ' g if and only if they are aﬃnely related, i.e. if and only if
f(s) = αg(s) + β for some α,β ∈ R with α ≥ 0.36 Now let C be any maximal collection
of aﬃnely related acts. Note that there is a unique prior qC ∈ QE that minimizes
R
f dq
over QE for all f ∈ C. It is clear that C satisﬁes Part (i) in Def. 2.3; however, it does not




f dqC for a non-constant act




g dqC for any other act g ∈ C, because f and g are aﬃnely
36In general, f and g are aﬃnely related if u ◦ f = αu ◦ g + β, with α,β as above. But recall that, for all
examples, X = {$0,$10}, so Y can be identiﬁed with [0,1] and it is w.l.o.g. to assume that u(y) = y.
25related. Thus, there exists a one-parameter family (hence, a continuum) of probabilities that
represent preferences on C.37 Consequently, no plausible prior can be elicited.
Since in this example f ' g (if and) only if f and g are aﬃnely related, it is easy to
see that only constant acts are robustly mixture neutral. Hence, Axiom 7 is violated in
a relatively trivial sense. However, the preferences in Example 5 also violate a variant of
Axiom 7 wherein robust mixture neutrality is replaced with simple mixture neutrality.38
Since the state space is ﬁnite, the discussion preceding Axiom 7 strongly suggests that
considerations other than variability reduction, or hedging, determine Edith’s violations of
mixture neutrality. Moreover, Edith’s preferences satisfy a strict version of Schmeidler’s
“Uncertainy Aversion” axiom [30, p. 582]. In this respect, Edith behaves very diﬀerently
from a SEU decision-maker when choosing from a suﬃciently rich (although possibly “small”)
set of acts: she is not a “local” SEU maximizer.
Note that the preferences in Example 5, as well as arbitrary MEU preferences, can be
approximated arbitrarily closely by MEU preferences that do satisfy Axiom 7. This indi-
cates that, loosely speaking, plausible-priors preferences are “dense” in the class of MEU
preferences, so that the additional restrictions they are required to satisfy do not exact a
signiﬁcant price in terms of expressive power.
As the approximation becomes more accurate, it might appear that the behavioral dis-
tinction between preferences that permit the elicitation of plausible priors and those that
don’t “becomes small”—and hence, so does the distinction between plausible priors and el-
ements of sets such as QE in Example 5. But, intuitively and formally, the proposed notion
of plausibility is binary: either a prior provides a unique SEU representation of preferences
on some set of acts, or it does not. On the other hand, to formalize the above “continuity”
intuition, a behaviorally founded notion of degrees of plausibility is required. Similar issues
arise in connection with ambiguity: for instance, refer to Example 1, the Ellsberg Paradox,
and consider the set of priors Q
A = {q : q(r) = 1
3,q(g) ∈ [1
3 − , 1
3 + ]}. For all  > 0,
however “small”, the events {g} and {b} are ambiguous, and the decision-maker is deemed
ambiguity averse; but  = 0 corresponds to SEU preferences.
I emphasize that a preference that does not admit plausible priors need not be consid-
ered “defective”. As discussed in the Introduction, the intuitive interpretation of multiple
37I.e., the set QC = {q ∈ R3
+ :
P




i fiqC(si)}, where f ∈ C is non-constant.
Geometrically, QC is a line segment in the simplex in R3 tangent to QE at qC. Due to the shape of QE, the
set QC is non-degenerate (i.e. not a singleton) for any maximal collection C of aﬃnely related acts.
38It can be shown that such a version of Axiom 7 characterizes MEU preferences that admit plausible
priors
26priors may or may not apply to such preferences; however, alternative, behaviorally-based
interpretations may be possible. For instance, Wang [33] provides an axiomatization of an
entropy-based multiple-priors model. Another alternative is considered in Siniscalchi [31].
Other decision models (e.g. CEU) may have natural interpretations that are unrelated to
probabilistic priors, and as such are not aﬀected by the considerations in the Introduction.
4.2 Related Literature
4.2.1 Probabilistic Representations of Ambiguity
Sets of probabilities provide an intuitively appealing representation of ambiguity in the α-
MEU decision model. Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci [12, GMM henceforth] and
Nehring [27] formalize this key insight, and show that it applies to a broader class of prefer-
ences. GMM take as primitive a preference relation over acts that satisﬁes Axioms 1–5, and
derive from it an auxiliary, incomplete relation ∗ that is intended to capture “unambigu-
ous” comparisons of acts; they then show that ∗ admits a representation ` a la Bewley [3]:
there exists a set Q of probability charges such that, for all acts f,g ∈ L,
f 
∗ g ⇔ ∀Q ∈ Q,
Z
u ◦ f dQ ≥
Z
u ◦ g dQ. (4)
Loosely speaking, Nehring takes as primitive both a preference relation  on acts, and an
incomplete unambiguous likelihood relation D on events; he then axiomatically relates the
two, and provides a Bewley-style representation of D analogous to Eq. (4). Both papers
suggest that a non-singleton set Q is associated with ambiguity; GMM and Nehring then
develop these ideas in several, complementary directions.
Thus, both GMM and Nehring identify a set of probabilities that, as a whole, provides
a speciﬁc representation of “unambiguous” preferences and beliefs. This is appropriate for
their purposes, but does not achieve the objectives of the present paper: it is not intended to
deliver priors that can be deemed “plausible” according to the stringent behavioral criteria
set forth in Def. 2.3. Speciﬁcally, the identiﬁcation issues highlighted in the Introduction for
MEU priors apply verbatim to sets of probabilities in the representation of Bewley preferences
such as ∗ (and, by analogy, D). Such sets are identiﬁed by the “functional-form” assumption
that they represent ∗ (or D) according to Eq. (4); but, just like a MEU preference, a Bewley
preference admits alternative representations, characterized by diﬀerent sets of priors.39
These considerations do not invalidate the insight that ambiguity can be represented
via sets of probabilities, or the related developments that are the main focus of GMM and
39Section 6.1 in the Online Appendix discusses Bewley preferences and provides examples.
27Nehring. Moreover, it can be shown that, under the additional axioms provided in the
present paper, the sets identiﬁed by GMM and Nehring can be obtained as the weak∗ closed,
convex hull of the set of plausible priors delivered by Theorem 2.6. However, as in the case of
MEU preferences, if Axioms 7 and 9 do not hold, the intuitive interpretation of the elements
of Q as possible probabilistic models of the underlying uncertainty is problematic.
Also note that a probabilistically sophisticated preference may give rise to a non-singleton
set Q in the GMM setup. By Proposition 3.2, this is never the case if Axioms 7 and 9 hold.
4.2.2 Other Related Literature
Castagnoli and Maccheroni [6] (see also [7]) explicitly assume that preferences satisfy the
Independence axiom when restricted to exogenously speciﬁed convex sets of acts, and derive a
representation analogous to Eq. (1); the corresponding probabilities are not unique. By way
of contrast, the approach adopted here entails deriving a proper covering from preferences,
and ensuring that the corresponding probabilities are unique.
Machina [25] investigates the robustness of “the analytics of the classical [i.e. SEU]
model... to behavior that departs from the probability-theoretic nature of the classical
paradigm.” [25, p. 1; italics added for emphasis]. Among other results, Machina shows
(Theorem 4, p. 34) that it is sometimes possible to associate with a speciﬁc act f0 a local
probability measure µf0 that represents the decision-maker’s “local revealed likelihood rank-
ings” and, jointly with a local utility function Uf0, her response to event-diﬀerential changes
in the act being evaluated. However, he is careful to point out that “the existence of a local
probability measure µf0 at each f0 should not be taken to imply the individual has conscious
probabilistic beliefs that somehow depend upon the act(s) being evaluated.” (p. 35; italics in
the original). This is fully consistent with the point of view advocated in the present paper:
a probability µ can be a useful analytical tool to model certain properties (e.g. responses to
diﬀerential changes) of the mathematical representation of preferences; however, for µ to be
deemed a “plausible prior”, additional behavioral conditions must be met.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Theorem 2.6.
5.1.1 Numerical Representation of preferences and restatement of the axioms
Overview. Lemma 5.1 provides a basic representation for the preference . Henceforth, the
analysis can be carried out with reference to this representation. Lemma 5.2 then furnishes
28basic properties of the relations ' and ≈. These are employed in Lemma 5.3 to translate
Axioms 7–9 into properties of the functional representation of preferences. Building on these
properties, Lemma 5.4 derives further key properties of ' and ≈. All proofs are in the
Online Appendix.
Lemma 5.1 The preference relation  satisﬁes Axioms 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 if and only if there
exists a non-constant aﬃne function u : Y → R and a unique, normalized, monotonic and
c-linear functional I : B(S,Σ) → R, such that, for all f,g ∈ L, f  g iﬀ I(u ◦ f) ≥ I(u ◦ g).
Furthermore, u can be chosen so u(Y ) ⊃ [−1,1]. Finally, for all a,b ∈ B(S,Σ), |I(a)−I(b)| ≤
ka − bk.
Throughout the remainder of the appendix, u and I denote a utility function and, re-
spectively, a functional, with the properties indicated in Lemma 5.1.
Denote by B1(S,Σ) the unit ball of B(S,Σ). With an abuse of notation, I write a ' b
for functions a,b ∈ B(S,Σ) as a shorthand for “I(αa + (1 − α)b) = αI(a) + (1 − α)I(b) for
all α ∈ [0,1]”. Similarly, I write a ≈ b iﬀ, for every c ∈ B(S,Σ) and c0 ∈ {λa + (1 − λ)b :
λ ∈ (0,1)}, there exists γ ∈ (0,1) such that γc + (1 − γ)c0 ' a and γc + (1 − γ)c0 ' b.
Lemma 5.2 Suppose  satisﬁes Axioms 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, and let I,u be its representation.
1. For all f,g ∈ L, f ' g iﬀ u ◦ f ' u ◦ g.
2. For all a,b ∈ B(S,Σ), and α,β ∈ R with α ≥ 0: a ' b implies a ' αb + β.
3. For all a,b ∈ B(S,Σ): a ≈ b iﬀ, for all c ∈ B1(S,Σ) and c0 ∈ {λa+(1−λ)b : λ ∈ (0,1)},
there exists γ ∈ (0,1) such that γc + (1 − γ)c0 ' a and γc + (1 − γ)c0 ' b. That is,
only functions c ∈ B1(S,Σ) need be considered in the deﬁnition of ≈ for functions.
4. For all f,g ∈ L, f ≈ g iﬀ u ◦ f ≈ u ◦ g.
5. For all a,b ∈ B(S,Σ): a ≈ b implies a ' b.
6. For all a,b ∈ B(S,Σ), and α,β ∈ R with α > 0: a ≈ b implies a ≈ αb + β.
Lemma 5.3 Suppose  satisﬁes Axioms 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, and let I,u be its representation.
1.  satisﬁes Axiom 7 iﬀ, for any sequence {an}n≥1 ⊂ B1(S,Σ) such that an(s) → a(s)
for all s ∈ S and some a ∈ B1(S,Σ), there is N ≥ 1 such that n ≥ N implies an ≈ a.
2.  satisﬁes Axiom 8 iﬀ, for any sequence {an}n≥1 ⊂ B1(S,Σ) such that an(s) → a(s)
for all s ∈ S, I(an) → I(a).
3.  satisﬁes Axiom 9 iﬀ, for all a,b,c ∈ B1(S,Σ), a ≈ b and c ≈ γb + (1 − γ)c for some
γ ∈ (0,1) imply αa + (1 − α)c ≈ βb + (1 − β)c for all α,β ∈ [0,1].
29Henceforth, the analysis will focus on the properties and representation of the functional
I on B1(S,Σ). In order to streamline the exposition, expressions such as “by Axiom 8 and
Part (2) of Lemma 5.3, I(an) → I(a)” will be shortened to “by Axiom 8, I(an) → I(a).”
That is, references to Axioms 7, 8, or 9 should be interpreted as references to the respective
equivalent conditions on I provided in Lemma 5.3.
I remark that Axiom 9 will be most often invoked with α = 0, β = 1 or α = 1,β = 1:
that is, c ≈ γa + (1 − γ)b implies c ≈ a and c ≈ b. However, the full force of the Axiom will
be needed in the proof of Lemma 5.6, Part (3).
Lemma 5.4 Suppose  satisﬁes Axioms 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 7, 9. Let I,u be its representation.
1. If {an},{bn} ⊂ B1(S,Σ), an(s) → a(s), bn(s) → b(s) for all s, and an ' bn for all n,
then a ' b.
2. For every a ∈ B1(S,Σ), a ≈ a.
3. For every a ∈ B1(S,Σ) and β ∈ R, a ≈ β (thus, a ≈ b implies a ≈ αb + β for α ≥ 0
and β ∈ R: cf. Lemma 5.2, Part 6).
4. If a ≈ b, then for all {cn} ⊂ B1(S,Σ) such that, for some c ∈ {λa+(1−λ)b : λ ∈ (0,1)},
cn(s) → c(s) for all s, there exists N ≥ 1 such that n ≥ N implies cn ≈ a,b, hence
cn ' a,b.
5. If a ≈ b and α,β ∈ [0,1], then αa + (1 − α)b ≈ βa + (1 − β)b.
6. If {an},{bn},{a,b} ⊂ B1(S,Σ) are such that an(s) → a(s), bn(s) → b(s) for all s, and
an ≈ bn for each n, then a ≈ b.
5.1.2 Necessity of the Axioms
It can now be shown that (2) implies (1) in Theorem 2.6. The following, preliminary result
collects useful properties of proper coverings; in particular, (1) below is related to (ii) in
Theorem 2.6.
Lemma 5.5 Consider a proper covering C. Then:
(1) Suppose that a ≈ b implies a,b ∈ C for some C ∈ C. Then every convex set D having
non-empty algebraic interior40 and such that a,b ∈ D implies a ≈ b is included in some
C ∈ C.
(2) If C,C0 ∈ C, then C ∩ C0 is a subset of the boundary of C (and C0). Consequently,
the intersection of any two C,C0 ∈ C has empty interior, and a point in the interior of some
40That is, there exists d ∈ D such that, for all a ∈ D, there exists b ∈ D such that 1
2a + 1
2b = d.
30C ∈ C belongs to no other C0 ∈ C. Thus, if a ≈ b implies a,b ∈ C0 for some C0 ∈ C, c is in
the interior of C ∈ C, and d ≈ c, then d ∈ C.
Proof.
(1) Let D have the required properties and consider d ∈ D in the algebraic interior of D.
Since C is a covering, d ∈ C for some C ∈ C. Now consider an arbitrary a ∈ D: then there
exists b ∈ D such that 1
2a + 1
2b = d. By assumption, a,b ∈ C0 for some (possibly diﬀerent)
C0 ∈ C; since C0 is convex, d ∈ C0. Thus, one has d ∈ C ∩ C0 and a,b ∈ C0: then, by Part
(2) in Def. 2.5, a,b ∈ C as well. Since a was arbitrary, D ⊂ C.
(2) Suppose there exists c ∈ C∩C0 such that c is an interior point of C. The (non-empty)
topological interior of C coincides with its algebraic interior (cf. e.g. Holmes [18], §11.A), so
for every a ∈ C there exists b ∈ C such that 1
2a + 1
2b = c. By Part (2) in Def. 2.5, a,b ∈ C0:
that is, C ⊂ C0, which contradicts the requirement that no two elements of C be nested.
Thus, c must lie in the boundary of C; similarly, it must lie in the boundary of C0.
Now let u, C and {Pn} be as in Theorem 2.6, (2). Then u ◦ f ∈ Cn ∩ Cm implies that R
u ◦ f dPn =
R
u ◦ f dPm. Since every Cn is a cone, this holds for all a ∈ B(S,Σ). Hence,
one can deﬁne I : B(S,Σ) → R by letting I(a) =
R
adPn for a ∈ Cn. Then (I,u) represent
. It is possible, of course, to assume that u(Y ) ⊃ [−1,1]. Furthermore, since each Pn is
unique, I is also unique.
Let a ∈ B(S,Σ), β ∈ R+ and γ ∈ R. Since each Cn is a convex cone that contains




β ∈ Cn; hence, I(βa + γ) = R
(βa + γ)dPn = β
R
adPn + γ = βI(a) + γ, i.e. I is c-linear.




bdPn for all n ≥ 1.
Since u(Y ) ⊃ [−1,1], there exist f,g ∈ L and α > 0 such that u ◦ f = αa and u ◦ g = αb.
Then (iii) implies that f  g; since (I,u) represent  and I is positively homogeneous, this
is equivalent to I(a) = 1
αI(u ◦ f) ≥ 1
αI(u ◦ g) = I(b), i.e. I is monotonic.
Now Lemma 5.1 implies that I satisﬁes Axioms 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. To see that Axioms
8 and 7 hold, consider a ∈ B1(S,Σ) and a bounded sequence {ak} in B1(S,Σ) such that
ak(s) → a(s) for all s.
If a lies in the interior of some Cm ∈ C, so that, by Part (2) of Lemma 5.5, it belongs
to no other element of C, then Part (3) in Def. 2.5 implies that there exists K ≥ 1 such
that, for k ≥ K, ak,a ∈ Cm. Then, since Pm is countably additive and the sequence {ak} is




adPm = I(a); and since
I(ak) =
R
ak dPm for k ≥ K, I(ak) → I(a), as required.
Now assume instead that a lies on the boundary of Cm. Let  > 0. Then there exists c
in the interior of Cm such that ka − ck < 
3. Furthermore, the sequence {ak − [a − c]}k≥1
31is bounded and converges pointwise to c; hence, by the argument just given, there exists K
such that k ≥ K implies |I(c) − I(ak − [a − c])| < 
3. We then have, for k ≥ K,
|I(a) − I(ak)| ≤ |I(a) − I(c
)| + |I(c
) − I(ak − [a − c
])| + |I(ak − [a − c
]) − I(ak)| <




+ kak − a + c





Thus, again I(ak) → I(a). Part (1) of Lemma 5.3 now implies that Axiom 8 holds.
Next, I claim that a,b ∈ Cn ∈ C implies a ≈ b. Fix c ∈ B(S,Σ) and c0 = λa+(1−λ)b ∈ Cn
for some λ ∈ (0,1). Let ck = 1
kc + 1−k
k c0, so ck → c0 uniformly. By Part (3) in Def. 2.5, for
k large, there exists Cnk such that ck,c0 ∈ Cnk. Then c0 ∈ Cnk ∩ Cn, which, by Part (2) in
Def. 2.5, implies that also a,b ∈ Cnk. Thus, for such k, and for every α ∈ [0,1], I(αa+(1−
α)ck) =
R
[αa + (1 − α)ck]dPnk = α
R
adPnk + (1 − α)
R
ck dPnk = αI(a) + (1 − α)I(ck), i.e.
1
kc + k−1
k c0 = ck ' a; similarly, 1
kc + k−1
k c0 ' b. Thus, a ≈ b.
Now, to see that Axiom 7 holds, consider {ak} ⊂ B1(S,Σ) u.b. and such that ak(s) →
a(s) ∈ B1(S,Σ) for all s. By Part (3) in Def. 2.5, for k large, there exists Cnk such that
ak,a ∈ Cnk; as was just shown, this implies that ak ≈ a for such k. Part (2) of Lemma 5.3
then implies that Axiom 7 holds.
Finally, consider a,b,c ∈ B1(S,Σ) such that a ≈ b and c ≈ γa+(1−γ)b for some γ ∈ (0,1).
By (ii) in Theorem 2.6, there exists n,m ≥ 1 such that a,b ∈ Cn and c,γa + (1 − γ)b ∈ Cm.
Thus, γa + (1 − γ)b ∈ Cn ∩ Cm. By Part (2) in Def. 2.5, a,b ∈ Cm; hence, for all α,β ∈
[0,1], αa + (1 − α)c,βb + (1 − β)c ∈ Cm as well. As was shown above, this implies that
αa + (1 − α)c ≈ βb + (1 − β)c. Thus, by Part (3) of Lemma 5.3, Axiom 9 holds, and the
proof of necessity is complete.
5.1.3 Suﬃciency: Covering C(S) ∩ B1(S,Σ).
Turn now to the other direction. Assume throughout that Axioms 1-8, 7 and 9 hold for the
preference relation . Continue to denote by I,u its representation per Lemma 5.1.
Recall that (S,Σ) is assumed to be a standard Borel space: that is, there exists a Polish
topology τ ⊂ 2S such that Σ is the Borel σ-algebra generated by τ. However, by the Borel
Isomorphism theorem (Kechris [20], Theorem 15.6), it is suﬃcient to prove the characteriza-
tion result for S compact metrizable, with Σ its Borel σ-algebra [See the Online Appendix
for additional details.]
This subsection and the next contain the heart of the proof that (1) ⇒ (2) in Theorem
2.6. The objective is to construct a proper covering of B(S,Σ); since I is c-linear, it is
actually suﬃcient to construct a suitable covering of B1(S,Σ), the unit ball of B(S,Σ).
32Overview. Lemma 5.6 establishes the existence of a covering of certain convex subsets of
B1(S,Σ) whose elements are maximal convex sets containing all constant functions, charac-
terized by the property that, if a,b are functions belonging to the same subset, then a ≈ b.
Lemma 5.7 then shows that the covering C0 of the set C(S)∩B1(S,Σ) of continuous functions
with norm at most 1 delivered by Lemma 5.6 has a special structure (and in fact extends
to a proper covering of C(S), although this is not essential to the argument). Finally, Lem-
mata 5.8 and 5.9 in the next subsection exploit the structure of C0 to construct a covering
of B1(S,Σ) that extends (by c-linearity of I) to a proper covering of B(S,Σ).
Lemma 5.6 Let M be a convex subset of B1(S,Σ) that contains all constant functions γ1S,
γ ∈ [−1,1]. There exists a unique, non-empty collection C of convex subsets of M such that:
(1) For all C ∈ C, γ1S ∈ C for all γ ∈ [−1,1];
(2) For all C ∈ C and a,b ∈ C, a ≈ b;
(3) For all C ∈ C, if a ∈ M satisﬁes a ≈ c for all c ∈ C, then a ∈ C, i.e. C is ⊂-maximal
with respect to the relation ≈. In particular, for every C,D ∈ D and a ∈ C\D there exists
b ∈ D such that a 6≈ b, so the elements of C are not nested.
(4) For all a ∈ M, there exists C ∈ C such that a ∈ C. More generally, every convex
subset D of M that satisﬁes (1) and (2) is contained in some C ∈ C.
Finally, if M is norm-closed, then so are the elements of C.
Note that, in general, elements of the covering constructed in this Lemma may have
empty interior. Note also that, although attention is restricted to elements of a given subset
of B1(S,Σ), in order to determine whether a ≈ b, one still needs to consider all functions
c ∈ B1(S,Σ) and verify that, for all c0 ∈ {λa + (1 − λ)b : λ ∈ (0,1)}, there is γ ∈ (0,1) such
that γc + (1 − γ)c0 ' a,b. That is, the “test set” of perturbations is all of B1(S,Σ).
Proof. Let C0 be the collection of all convex subsets of M satisfying properties (1) and
(2) above. In particular, for every a ∈ M, {αa + (1 − α)γ1S : α ∈ [0,1],γ ∈ [−1,1]} ∈
C0, because M is a convex subset of B1(S,Σ) that includes γ1S for all γ ∈ [−1,1], and
αa+(1−α)γ ≈ α0a+(1−α0)γ0 for all appropriate α,α0,γ,γ0, by Lemma 5.4, Parts 2 and 3.
Partially order C0 by set inclusion (⊂). If C00 ⊂ C0 is a chain, consider C =
S
C0∈C00 C0; then
C satisﬁes (1), and, furthermore, if a,b ∈ C, then a,b ∈ C0 for some C0 ∈ C00, which ensures
that C is a convex set that satisﬁes (2) as well. Hence, C ∈ C0.
Now let C be the set of all maximal elements of (C0,⊂); Zorn’s Lemma ensures that C is
non-empty. Every element C ∈ C is a convex set that satisﬁes (1) and (2). The norm-closure
¯ C of any C ∈ C is also convex and satisﬁes (1); furthermore, it satisﬁes (2), because, for any
pair of sequences {an},{bn} ⊂ C such that an → a, bn → b for a,b ∈ ¯ C, an ≈ bn for all n
33implies that a ≈ b by Lemma 5.4, Part 6. Therefore, if M is norm-closed, every maximal
element C of (C0,⊂) must be norm-closed.
For (3), consider D ∈ C, so D satisﬁes (1) and (2). Suppose that, for some c ∈ M \ D,
c ≈ d for all d ∈ D. The set D+c = {αc+(1−α)d : d ∈ D, α ∈ [0,1]} is a convex subset of
M that properly contains D, and hence satisﬁes (1). To see that it also satisﬁes (2), consider
αc + (1 − α)d,α0c + (1 − α0)d0 ∈ D+c, so d,d0 ∈ D and α,α0 ∈ [0,1]. Since D ∈ C, d ≈ d0
and 1
2d + 1
2d0 ∈ D; furthermore, by assumption, c ≈ 1
2d + 1
2d0. Thus, Axiom 9 implies that
also αc+(1−α)d ≈ α0c+(1−α0)d0. Thus, D ( D+c ∈ C0, a contradiction. In particular, if
c ∈ C \ D, then c ∈ M, so there must be d ∈ D such that c 6≈ d.
For (4), consider any convex set D ∈ C0 and let C0
D ⊂ C0 be the collection of convex sets
C0 ∈ C0 such that D ⊂ C0. Order C0
D by set inclusion, and argue as above to conclude that
C0
D has at least one maximal element, say ¯ D. Then ¯ D must also be a maximal element of
C0: suppose that ¯ D ⊂ C0 for some C0 ∈ C0. Since ¯ D ∈ C0
D, D ⊂ ¯ D ⊂ C0, so C0 ∈ C0
D; but
since ¯ D is maximal in C0
D, C0 ⊂ ¯ D must hold, i.e. ¯ D is also maximal in C0. Hence, every
D ∈ C0 is contained in some C ∈ C; in particular, by the argument given above, every a ∈ M
is contained in some C ∈ C.
Finally, C is the only collection of (closed), convex sets for which (1)-(4) hold. To see
this, consider another collection D having the same properties. Fix D ∈ D; then D is a
convex set that satisﬁes (1) and (2), and therefore it is contained in some C ∈ C. Moreover,
if D 6= C, then there exists a ∈ C \D such that a ≈ b for all b ∈ D ⊂ C; by (4), a ∈ D0 ∈ D,
and indeed a ∈ D0 \ D; hence, (3) is violated. Thus, D = C. Therefore, D ⊂ C; the same
argument shows that C ⊂ D, so D = C.
Now let C0 be the covering provided by Lemma 5.6 for M = C(S) ∩ B1(S,Σ), the unit
ball of the set of continuous functions on S.
Lemma 5.7 For every C ∈ C0, there exists c ∈ C such that a ∈ B(S,Σ) and a ≈ c imply
a ≈ b for all b ∈ C. In particular, a ∈ C(S) ∩ B1(S,Σ) and a ≈ b imply a ∈ C.
A function c ∈ C with the properties mentioned in the above statement will be henceforth
referred to as a critical point.
Proof. Recall that C(S), endowed with its relative norm topology, is a separable (cf
e.g. [2], Theorem 7.47) metric space. Thus, every C ∈ C0 is also separable ([2], Corollary
3.2). Furthermore, since C(S)∩B1(S,Σ) is norm-closed, Lemma 5.6 also ensures that every
C ∈ C0 is closed as well. This implies that, if {bn} is a sequence in C ∈ C0 and {βn}n≥1 is a
sequence in (0,1) such that
P
n βn ≤ 1, the series
P
n βnbn converges in C.
34Now ﬁx C ∈ C0 and let {c1,c2,...,} be a countable dense subset of C. Fix a collection
{αn}n≥1 ∈ (0,1)N such that
P
n αn = 1, and deﬁne c =
P
n αncn.
I claim that, if a ∈ B(S,Σ) satisﬁes a ≈ c, then a ≈ cn for all n ≥ 1. To see this, note














1−αnck ∈ C and αn ∈ (0,1), Axiom 9 implies the claim. Now ﬁx b ∈ C; I
claim that a ≈ c implies a ≈ b. To see this, note that there is a sequence {cnk}k≥1 ⊂ {cn}n≥1
such that cnk → b in norm. Since a ≈ cnk for all k, Lemma 5.4, Part 6 implies that a ≈ b, as
needed. In particular, by Lemma 5.6, Part (3), a ≈ c for some a ∈ C(S) ∩ B1(S,Σ) implies
a ∈ C, as required.
5.1.4 Suﬃciency: Proper Covering of B(S,Σ)
In order to extend C0 to a covering of B1(S,Σ), consider the Baire hierarchy of functions
from S to [−1,1] (Kechris [20], §24).
Let B1 contain all pointwise limits of sequences of continuous functions from S to [−1,1]:
that is, b ∈ B1 iﬀ there exists a sequence {an}n≥1 in C(S)∩B1(S,Σ) such that an(s) → b(s)
for all s ∈ S. Recursively, for every ordinal ξ such that 1 < ξ < ω1 (the latter symbol
denotes the ﬁrst uncountable ordinal), consider the set Bξ of functions b : S → [−1,1] for
which one can ﬁnd a sequence {an} of functions such that (i) for every n ≥ 1, an ∈ Bξn for
some ξn < ξ, and (ii) an(s) → b(s) for all s ∈ S.
Note that, trivially, all limits above involve uniformly bounded sequences of functions.
Furthermore, C(S) ∩ B1(S,Σ) ⊂ B1 ⊂ ... ⊂ Bξ ⊂ ... ⊂ Bη ⊂ ..., for any ξ ≤ η < ω1.
By Theorem 24.10 and Exercise 24.13 in Kechris [20], B1 is the set of functions of Baire
class 1. Consequently, by Theorem 24.3 in [20],
S
ξ Bξ is the class of Borel-measurable
functions from S to [−1,1], i.e. B1(S,Σ). Furthermore, each member Bξ of the Baire
hierarchy is easily seen to be a convex41 subset of B1(S,Σ) that contains all constant functions
γ1S for γ ∈ [0,1].
For notational convenience, let B0 = C(S)∩B1(S,Σ); also let ϕ0 : C0 → C0 be the identity
function. Let Cξ be a covering of Bξ by convex sets, as per Lemma 5.6.
Lemma 5.8 For every ordinal ξ < ω1, there exists a one-to-one map ϕξ : C0 → Cξ such
that, for every C ∈ C0:
41See the argument for the convexity of ϕξ(C) in the proof of Lemma 5.8.
35(i) if η < ξ, then ϕη(C) ⊂ ϕξ(C);
(ii) if ξ > 0, then a ∈ ϕξ(C) iﬀ there exists a sequence bn that converges pointwise to a
and such that, for every n ≥ 1, there is an ordinal ξn < ξ such that bn ∈ ϕξn(C);
(iii) if c is a critical point of C, then a ∈ B(S,Σ) and a ≈ c imply a ≈ b for all
b ∈ ϕξ(C)—so, in particular a ∈ ϕξ(C) if a ∈ Bξ;
(iv) the collection {ϕξ(C) : C ∈ C0} covers Bξ.
Proof. The claim is true for ξ = 0: (i) and (ii) hold vacuously, (iii) follows directly from
Lemma 5.7, and (iv) holds because ϕ0 is the identity function on C0. For ξ > 0, consider
C ∈ C0 and let ϕξ(C) be the set of functions a ∈ Bξ that are pointwise limits of sequences
{bn} in B1(S,Σ) such that, for every n ≥ 1, bn ∈ ϕξn(C) for some ξn < ξ.
I claim that ϕξ(C) is a convex subset of Bξ that satisﬁes conditions (1) and (2) of Lemma
5.6. To see this, note ﬁrst that ϕξ(C) contains C (consider constant sequences from C =
ϕ0(C)). Hence, in particular it contains all constant functions γ1S, for γ ∈ [−1,1]. Next,
let a,b ∈ ϕξ(C), so there exist sequences {an} and {bn} converging pointwise to a and b
respectively, and such that, for every n ≥ 1, an ∈ ϕξa









otherwise, the reverse inclusion holds. Moreover, again by the induction hypothesis, for
every n ≥ 1, ϕmax(ξa
n,ξb
n)(C) is an element of Cmax(ξa
n,ξb
n), hence a (maximal) convex set that





n) < ξ; furthermore, an ≈ bn. Finally, the sequence
{αan + (1 − α)bn} converges to αa + (1 − α)b pointwise. Hence, the latter is a member of
ϕξ(C), and by Lemma 5.4, Part 6, a ≈ b. Thus, ϕξ(C) satisﬁes conditions (1) and (2) of
Lemma 5.6 for the subset Bξ of B1(S,Σ). Therefore, it is included in at least one element of
Cξ. Let C0 be one such element. It will now be shown that C0 ⊂ ϕξ(C), so in fact C0 = ϕξ(C).
Fix a ∈ C0 and let c ∈ C be a critical point of C. Then c ∈ C0, a ≈ c and, for all
α ∈ (0,1), αc+(1−α)a ∈ C0. Since a ∈ Bξ, there exists a sequence bn converging pointwise
to a such that bn ∈ Bξn and ξn < ξ for each n. Thus, for every α ∈ (0,1), αc + (1 − α)bn
converges pointwise to αc + (1 − α)a, and since c ∈ B0 and Baire classes are increasing and
convex, αc + (1 − α)bn ∈ Bξn.
Now ﬁx one such α ∈ (0,1). By Axiom 7, there exists N(α) ≥ 1 such that αc+(1−α)a ≈
αc + (1 − α)bn for all n ≥ N(α); thus, by Axiom 9, αc + (1 − α)bn ≈ c for such n. Since
αc + (1 − α)bn ∈ Bξn, Part (iii) of the the induction hypothesis implies that, for such n,
αc + (1 − α)bn ∈ ϕξn(C).
To summarize: for any α ∈ (0,1) there exists N(α) such that, if n ≥ N(α), then
αc+(1−α)bn ∈ ϕξn(C). Now deﬁne a sequence {¯ bk} as follows. Let n1 = 0 and ¯ b1 = c; then,
for k ≥ 2, let nk = max(N(1
k),nk−1) + 1 and¯ bk ≡ 1
kc + k−1
k bnk ∈ ϕξnk(C). Now ¯ bk(s) → a(s)
36for all s:
|¯ bn(s) − a(s)| =


















|c(s) − a(s)| +
k − 1
k
|bnk(s) − a(s)| → 0;
hence, by construction, a ∈ ϕξ(C).
Since a was arbitrarily chosen in C0, the proof that C0 ⊂ ϕξ(C) is complete. Since by
assumption ϕξ(C) ⊂ C0, actually C0 = ϕξ(C); in particular, there is exactly one element of Cξ
that contains ϕξ(C). Thus, ϕξ : C0 → Cξ is well-deﬁned and, by construction, it satisﬁes (i)
and (ii); furthermore, ϕξ must be one-to-one, because ϕξ(C) = ϕξ(D) for distinct C,D ∈ C0
violates the maximality of C and D.
To see that (iii) must also hold, suppose a ∈ B(S,Σ) satisﬁes a ≈ c, and consider an
arbitrary b ∈ ϕξ(C); by construction, b is the (u.b.) pointwise limit of a sequence {bn} such
that, for every n ≥ 1, bn ∈ ϕξn(C) for some ξn < ξ. Since c ∈ ϕξn(C) for all n as well, a ≈ c
and Part (iii) of the induction hypothesis imply that a ≈ bn for all n; therefore, by Lemma
5.4, Part 6, a ≈ b, as required. If a ∈ Bξ, then, by Part (3) of Lemma 5.6, a ≈ b for all
b ∈ ϕξ(C) ∈ Cξ implies a ∈ ϕξ(C).
Turn now to (iv). Fix a ∈ Bξ, and let {bn} be a sequence that converges pointwise to a
such that, for all n ≥ 1, bn ∈ Bξn for some ξn < ξ. By the induction hypothesis, Part (iv),
bn ∈ ϕξn(Cn) for some Cn ∈ C0. Let cn be a critical point of Cn. Recall that cn ∈ ϕξn(Cn),
so clearly bn ≈ cn. For n ≥ 1, let ¯ bn = 1
ncn + n−1
n bn; then clearly ¯ bn ∈ ϕξn(Cn), and for every
s ∈ S,
|¯ bn(s) − a(s)| =

















|cn(s) − a(s)| +
n − 1
n




· (kcnk + kak) +
n − 1
n







|bn(s) − a(s)| → 0,
i.e. {¯ bn} also converges pointwise to a. By Axiom 7, a ≈ ¯ bn for n suﬃciently large; by Axiom
9, a ≈ cn for such n; ﬁnally, from Part (iii) of the result, since cn ∈ ϕξ(Cn) and a ∈ Bξ,
a ∈ ϕξ(Cn).
The unique proper covering of B(S,Σ) in Theorem 2.6 can ﬁnally be constructed:
37Lemma 5.9 There exists a unique proper covering C of B(S,Σ) such that (i) for all C ∈ C,
a,b ∈ C implies a ≈ b, and (ii) if a,b ∈ B(S,Σ) are such that a ≈ b, then a,b ∈ C for some
C ∈ C. Furthermore, C is ﬁnite or countable.






ϕξ(C) : C ∈ C0
)
. (5)
C∗ has the following properties. Clearly, each C∗ ∈ C∗ contains all constants γ1S, γ ∈ [−1,1].
Each C∗ ∈ C∗ is a convex subset of B1(S,Σ), and a,b ∈ C∗ implies a ≈ b: if a,b ∈ C∗ ∈
C∗, then a ∈ ϕη(C), b ∈ ϕζ(C) for some pair of ordinals η,ζ; hence, letting ξ = max(η,ζ),
a,b ∈ ϕξ(C), so αa + (1 − α)b ∈ ϕξ(C) ⊂ C∗ and a ≈ b, as required.
C∗ covers B1(S,Σ), because every a ∈ B1(S,Σ) belongs to some Bξ, ξ < ω1, and therefore,
by Part (iv) of Lemma 5.8, to some ϕξ(C), C ∈ C0.
Every C∗ ∈ C∗ contains a function c with kck < 1 and such that, for any a ∈ B1(S,Σ),
a ≈ c implies a ∈ C∗—i.e. c is a critical point of C∗. Consider C ∈ C0 and let c be a critical
point of C. Note that kck < 1.42 Let C∗ =
S
ξ<ω1 ϕξ(C) and consider a ∈ B1(S,Σ) . Then
a ∈ Bξ for some ξ < ω1: thus, by Part (iii) of Lemma 5.8, if a ≈ c, then a ∈ ϕξ(C), which
implies that a ∈ C∗.
Distinct elements of C∗ are not nested. If C∗,D∗ ∈ C∗ and C∗ ⊂ D∗, then D∗ contains
a critical point of C∗, and therefore, by the preceding property, D∗ ⊂ C∗; thus, distinct
elements of C∗ cannot be nested.
Each element of C∗ has non-empty interior. Consider C∗ ∈ C∗ and let c be a critical
point of C∗ with kck < 1. Suppose that, for every n > 0 such that the 1
n-ball around c
lies in B1(S,Σ), there exists bn ∈ B1(S,Σ) such that kbn − ck < 1
n and bn 6∈ C∗. Thus,
bn → c in the sup-norm topology, hence pointwise. But then Axiom 7 implies that bn ≈ c for
suﬃciently large n. Since c is a critical point of C∗, bn ∈ C∗ for such n, which contradicts
the construction of the sequence {bn}. Therefore, for some n > 0, C contains an open 1
n-ball
in B1(S,Σ) around c.
C∗ ∩ D∗ is an extremal subset of C∗ (and D∗) for all distinct C∗,D∗ ∈ C∗. To see this,
let αa + (1 − α)b ∈ C∗ ∩ D∗ for a,b ∈ C∗ and α ∈ (0,1); also let d be a critical point of D∗.
42In the notation of Lemma 5.7, suppose kcnk = 1 for all n. Then, for k > 1, no 1
k-ball in C(S) around
0 ∈ C contains an element of {cn}. Thus, kcnk < 1 for some n, so kck < 1.
38Then a ≈ b and d ≈ αa + (1 − α)b, so by Axiom 9, d ≈ a and d ≈ b. Since d is a critical
point of D∗, it follows that a,b ∈ D∗, so a,b ∈ C∗ ∩ D∗.
For all a,b ∈ B1(S,Σ): if a ≈ b, then there exists C∗ ∈ C∗ such that a,b ∈ C∗. Let a,b
be as stated, and deﬁne d = 1
2a + 1
2b. Then d ∈ C∗ for some C∗ ∈ C∗. If a = b, there is
nothing to prove. Otherwise, note that in particular c ≈ d for a critical point c of C∗. By
Axiom 9, this implies c ≈ a, c ≈ b; since c is a critical point of C∗, the assertion follows.
If a sequence {an} in B1(S,Σ) converges pointwise to a, then there exists N ≥ 1 such
that, for every n ≥ N, there exists C∗ ∈ C∗ such that an,a ∈ C∗. Note that, by Axiom 7,
there exists N ≥ 1 such that, for n ≥ N, an ≈ a. The previous property now implies the
claim.
The collection C0 (hence, the collection C∗) is at most countable. To see this, recall that
C(S)∩B1(S,Σ) is separable, and let {gn}n≥1 be an enumeration of a countable dense subset.
Also, for every C ∈ C0, let cC denote a critical point of C; since cC lies in the non-empty
interior of C, there exists C > 0 such that ka − ck < C implies a ∈ C. Thus, for distinct
C,D ∈ C0, it must be the case that kcC − cDk ≥ max(C,D).43 Since {gn}n≥1 is dense in
C(S) ∩ B1(S,Σ), for every C ∈ C0 one can choose n ≥ 1 such that kgn − cCk <
C
2 . This
deﬁnes a map N : C0 → N. Now suppose that, for distinct C,D ∈ C0, N(C) = N(D) = n.
Then kcC − cDk ≤ kcC − gnk + kgn − cDk < 1
2(C + D) ≤ max(C,D), a contradiction.
Hence, N(·) is an injection, so C0 is ﬁnite or countable.
To complete the proof, let {C∗
1,C∗
2,...} be an enumeration of C∗, and deﬁne
∀n ≥ 1, Cn = {γa : γ ∈ R++,a ∈ C
∗
n}; C = {Cn}n≥1. (6)
That is, each Cn is the cone generated by C∗
n. It may be veriﬁed that {Cn} is a proper
covering that satisﬁes (i) and (ii) in the Lemma [details in the Online Appendix].
To establish uniqueness, suppose D is another proper covering such that (i) and (ii)
hold. Fix D ∈ D. Then D has non-empty topological, hence algebraic interior; furthermore,
a,b ∈ D implies a ≈ b. By Part (1) of Lemma 5.5, there exists n such that D ⊂ Cn. On the
other hand, since Cn also has non-empty topological, hence algebraic interior, and a,b ∈ Cn
implies a ≈ b, by the same argument it is contained in some D0 ∈ D. Hence, D ⊂ Cn ⊂ D0;
but since elements of D are non-nested, D = D0 = Cn. Conclude that, for every D ∈ D,
there exists n such that D = Cn, so D ⊂ C. But the same argument implies that C ⊂ D, so
C = D, and the proof is complete.
43If not, then cC ∈ D, say, so for all d ∈ D, c ≈ d, which implies d ∈ C, i.e. D ⊂ C. In particular, cD ∈ C,
and by a similar argument C ⊂ D: thus, C = D.
39The following Corollary now establishes that {Cn}n≥1 is in fact the collection of (conic
hull of) sets delivered by Lemma 5.6: that is, it comprises all ⊂-maximal convex cones
containing the constants and consisting of robustly mixture-neutral functions. Furthermore,
it shows that each Cn is norm-closed.
Corollary 5.10 Let {Cn}n≥1 be the proper covering provided by Lemma 5.9. If C ⊂
B(S,Σ) is a convex cone that contains all constant functions γ1S, γ ∈ R, and a,b ∈ C
implies a ≈ b, then C ⊂ Cn for some Cn ∈ C. In particular, every Cn is norm-closed.
Proof. Suppose not: then, for every n ≥ 1, there exists an ∈ C such that an 6∈ Cn.
Since both C and Cn are cones, assume wlog that kank = 1. As in the proof of Lemma 5.7,
let {αn}n≥1 be such that αn ∈ (0,1) for all n ≥ 1 and
P
n αn = 1; then
P
n αnan converges
in norm, say to a ∈ B(S,Σ). Moreover, since C is a convex cone and a` ∈ C for all ` ≥ 1, Pm
`=1 α`a` ∈ C for all m ≥ 1; it follows that an ≈
Pm
n=1 αnan for all n,m ≥ 1, and taking
the limit of the r.h.s. as m → ∞, by Lemma 5.4, Part 6, an ≈ a for all n ≥ 1. Now,
since {Cn}n≥1 covers B(S,Σ), there exists n∗ ≥ 1 such that a ∈ Cn∗. As in Lemma 5.7,


















1−αn∗an,an∗ ∈ Cn∗∗ for some n∗∗ ≥ 1. Since Cn∗∗ is





1−αn∗an,an∗ ∈ Cn∗ ∩ Cn∗∗ ⊂ Cn∗. This contradicts the choice of an∗.
For the last implication, let ¯ Cn denote the norm-closure of some Cn, n ≥ 1, and consider
a,b ∈ ¯ Cn; then kan − ak → 0 and kbn − bk → 0 for some {an},{bn} ⊂ Cn. Now Lemma
5.9, Part (i) ensures that an ≈ bn for each n, and Lemma 5.4, Part 6 implies that a ≈ b.
Thus, by the result just established, ¯ Cn ⊂ Cm for some m ≥ 1; in particular, n = m, for
otherwise Cn ⊂ Cm, which contradicts the fact that {Cn} is a proper covering. Thus, Cn is
norm-closed.
5.1.5 Suﬃciency: completing the argument
Throughout the remainder of this section, C will denote the collection of convex cones con-
structed in Lemma 5.9.
First, the probabilities {Pn}n≥1 representing I on each element of C will be constructed.
Lemma 5.11 For every n ≥ 1, there exists a unique, countably additive probability measure
Pn on (S,Σ) such that, for all a ∈ Cn, I(a) =
R
adPn.
Proof. Observe ﬁrst that a,b ∈ Cn ∈ C implies a ≈ b, and hence, by Lemma 5.2, Part
5, a ' b: that is, the restriction of I to every Cn ∈ C is aﬃne.
40Now ﬁx n ≥ 1. Let c be a point in the interior of Cn: then, for every a ∈ B(S,Σ), there
exists α ∈ (0,1] such that ac ≡ αa + (1 − α)c ∈ Cn. Thus, a = 1
αac − 1−α
α c. Since a was
arbitrary and Cn is a cone, it follows that {a − b : a,b ∈ Cn} = B(S,Σ).
It may be veriﬁed that, for every n ≥ 1, it is possible to deﬁne a functional Jn : B(S,Σ) →
R by letting Jn(a−b) = I(a)−I(b) for all a,b ∈ Cn. Furthermore, each Jn is positive, additive,
and homogeneous.
Thus, Jn is linear and norm-continuous (cf. [2], Theorem 7.6) on B(S,Σ); furthermore,
kJnk = 1. Therefore, there exists a unique, ﬁnitely additive probability Pn on (S,Σ) such
that Jn(a) =
R
adPn for all a ∈ B(S,Σ) (cf. e.g. [2], Theorem 11.32). In particular,
I(a) = Jn(a − 0) =
R
adPn for all a ∈ Cn.
Now consider a sequence of events {Ak}≥1 such that Ak ⊃ Ak+1, k ≥ 1, and
T
k≥1 Ak = ∅.
Let c be an interior point of Cn such that, for some  > 0, a ∈ B(S,Σ) and ka − ck < 
implies a ∈ Cn. Consider the sequence {ck}k≥1 of functions deﬁned by ck(s) = c(s)+ 
21Ak(s)
for all s ∈ S and k ≥ 1. Then kck − ck = 
2 < , so ck ∈ Cn for all k ≥ 1. Since I is
monotonic, I(ck) ≥ I(ck+1) for all k ≥ 1; furthermore, for every s ∈ S there exists K ≥ 1
such that, for all k ≥ K, s 6∈ Ak, and therefore ck(s) = c(s). Thus, ck(s) → c(s) for all
s ∈ S, and the sequence {ck} is clearly bounded (e.g. by kck + ). Axiom 8 then implies
that I(ck) ↓ I(c), so that
Pn(Ak) = Jn(1Ak) =
2

Jn(ck − c) =
2

[I(ck) − I(c)] ↓ 0;
thus (cf. e.g. [2], Lemma 8.32), Pn is countably additive.
Remark 5 The preceding Lemma provides the key step in the proof of Proposition 2.2 for
the case C ( L. Speciﬁcally, suppose that  satisﬁes Axioms 1–5 and Mixture Neutrality on
such a set C of acts. Then, by Lemma 5.1 and arguments in the proof of Lemma 5.3 Part 1,
 is represented by a cardinally unique u and a monotonic, c-linear, normalized functional
I that is aﬃne on the set ¯ C = {a ∈ B(S,Σ) : a = γu ◦ f, γ ∈ R+, f ∈ C}. Proceeding as in
the proof of Lemma 5.11, deﬁne a positive linear functional J on ¯ C − ¯ C ⊂ B(S,Σ) by letting
J(a−b) = I(a)−I(b); notice that, in general, ¯ C− ¯ C 6= B(S,Σ). Now let J∗ denote a positive
Hahn-Banach extension of J to B(S,Σ), and apply the standard representation theorem to
obtain a probability charge P on (S,Σ) such that J∗(a) =
R
adP for all a ∈ B(S,Σ), and
in particular I(u ◦ f) = J(u ◦ f) = J∗(u ◦ f) =
R
u ◦ f dP for all f ∈ C. Note that, since
the Hahn-Banach extension J∗ is not unique in general, P is not the only probability charge
that represents  on C.
Jointly with the cardinally unique utility function u from Lemma 5.1 and the unique
proper covering C from Lemma 5.9, the collection {Pn}n≥1 of unique countably additive
41probability measures from Lemma 5.11 satisﬁes (i) of Theorem 2.6, Part (2). By Lemma
5.9, it is also the case that, if f ≈ g, hence u◦f ≈ u◦g, then u◦f,u◦g ∈ Cn for some n ≥ 1:
that is, (ii) also holds. Hence, to complete the proof of the Theorem, it must be shown that
(iii) holds as well. The following, preliminary Lemma provides the key step.
Lemma 5.12 Let a,b ∈ B(S,Σ). Then, for some K ≥ 1, there exists a ﬁnite collection
0 = α0 < α1 < ... < αK = 1 such that, for each k = 0,...,K − 1, there exists nk ≥ 1 such
that {α ∈ [0,1] : αa + (1 − α)b ∈ Cnk} = [αk,αk+1].
Proof. Let α0 = 0; for k ≥ 1, let
αk = sup{α ∈ [αk−1,1] : αa + (1 − α)b ≈ αk−1a + (1 − αk−1)b}.
By Lemma 5.4, Part 6, αka+(1−αk)b ≈ αk−1a+(1−αk−1)b (i.e. the supremum is achieved).
I claim that, if αk−1 < 1, then αk > αk−1. To see this, consider the sequence {bm} of
functions deﬁned by bm = 1
ma + m−1
m [αk−1a + (1 − αk−1)b]; thus, bm → αk−1a + (1 − αk−1)b
in norm. Axiom 7 then implies that there exists M ≥ 1 such that bm ≈ αk−1a+(1−αk−1)b
for m ≥ M; thus, αk ≥ 1
M + M−1
M αk−1 > αk−1.
Next, I claim that there exists K ≥ 1 such that αK = 1 (hence, αk = 1 for all k > K)
and αk < 1 for all k < K. Suppose not; then αk ↑ ¯ α ∈ [0,1]. Consider the sequence {bk} of
functions deﬁned by bk = αka+(1−αk)b; clearly, bk → ¯ αa+(1−¯ α)b, so Axiom 7 implies that
bk ≈ ¯ αa+(1−¯ α)b for large k. In other words, for large k, αka+(1−αk)b ≈ ¯ αa+(1−¯ α)b; but
this contradicts the fact that sup{α ∈ [αk,1] : αa+(1−α)b ≈ αka+(1−αk)b} = αk+1 < ¯ α.
Now Part (ii) of Lemma 5.9 and convexity of each Cn, n ≥ 1, imply that, for every
k = 0,...,K − 1, there exists nk ≥ 1 such that αa + (1 − α)b ∈ Cnk for all α ∈ [αk,αk+1].
Moreover, for k > 0, consider α ∈ [αh,αh+1) for some h < k; then αa + (1 − α)b 6≈
αk+1a + (1 − αk+1)b ∈ Cnk, for otherwise αha + (1 − αh)b ≈ αk+1a + (1 − αk+1)b (either
because α = αh, or by Axiom 9), which contradicts the fact that αh+1 < αk+1. Similarly,
consider α ∈ (αh,αh+1] for some h > k; then αa + (1 − α)b 6≈ αka + (1 − αk)b ∈ Cnk, for
otherwise αh+1a+(1−αh+1)b ≈ αka+(1−αk)b, which contradicts the fact that αk+1 < αh+1.
Thus, if α ∈ [0,1]\[αk,αk+1], then either αa+(1−α)b 6≈ αka+(1−αk)b, or αa+(1−α)b 6≈
αk+1a + (1 − αk+1)b; hence, by Part (i) of Lemma 5.9, αa + (1 − α)b 6∈ Cnk.





bdPn for all n ≥ 1. Let K, αk and nk be as in Lemma 5.12. For
every k = 0,...,K − 1,
Z
[αka + (1 − αk)b]dPnk ≤
Z
[αk+1a + (1 − α)k+1b]dPnk =
Z
[αk+1a + (1 − α)k+1b]dPnk+1 :




bdPnk and αk < αk+1, and the equality holds
because αk+1a+(1−αk+1)b ∈ Cnk∩Cnk+1. Thus, I(αka+(1−αk)b) ≤ I(αk+1a+(1−αk+1)b)
for all k = 0,...,K − 1; since α0 = 0 and αK = 1, I(b) ≤ I(a).
Finally, Lemma 5.13 implies that {Pn}n≥1 comprises all possible priors for . To see this,
assume that the set D below is the utility image of a collection C of acts as in Deﬁnition
2.3, and P is the unique prior identiﬁed by C. Then necessarily P = Pn for some n ≥ 1.
Lemma 5.13 Let D ⊂ B(S,Σ) be a convex set such that a,b ∈ Y implies a ' b. Then
there exists n ≥ 1 such that I(a) =
R
adPn for all a ∈ D.
Proof. Since I is norm-continuous, it is wlog to assume that D is norm-closed. Thus, D,
endowed with its relative metric topology, is complete. For every n ≥ 1, Cn is norm-closed
by Corollary 5.10, so D ∩Cn is relatively closed, and D =
S
n≥1 D ∩Cn. Thus, by the Baire
Category Theorem ([2], Corollary 3.28), there exists n ≥ 1 such that D ∩Cn has non-empty
relative interior. In particular, there exists c ∈ D ∩ Cn and  > 0 such that ka − ck <  and
a ∈ D imply a ∈ D ∩ Cn.
Now let Jn : B(S,Σ) → R be a linear functional such that Jn(a) = I(a) for all a ∈ D∩Cn.
I claim that then Jn(a) = I(a) for all a ∈ D. To see this, consider a ∈ Y ; by the preceding
argument, since D is convex, there exists γ ∈ (0,1] such that γa+(1−γ)c ∈ D ∩Cn. Thus,
γJn(a) = Jn(γa + (1 − γ)c) − (1 − γ)Jn(c) =
= I(γa + (1 − γ)c) − (1 − γ)I(c) =
= γI(a) + (1 − γ)I(c) − (1 − γ)I(c) = γI(a).
Therefore, in particular,
R
adPn = I(a) for all a ∈ D.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Denote by µ the convex-ranged probability charge in Def. 3.1. As in Subsection 5.1.2, let
I(a) =
R
adPn for all a ∈ Cn and n ≥ 1. I sometimes write Pn(a) in lieu of
R
adPn. Also
assume that u(X) ⊃ [−1,1] (recall that u(X) is convex by assumption).
I claim that µ is countably additive. To see this, consider a sequence of events {Ak}k≥1
such that Ak ⊃ Ak+1 and
T
k≥1 Ak = ∅. Let x1,x0 ∈ X be such that u(x1) = 1, u(x0) = 0.
Then, by Axioms 4 and 8, for every x ∈ X such that x  x0, there exists K ≥ 1 such that
k ≥ K implies x  x1 Ak x0; moreover, clearly x1 Ak x0  x0. Now suppose µ(Ak) ↓  > 0.
Since µ is convex-ranged, there exists an event E such that µ(E) = ; by Def. 3.1, since
µ({s : x1Akx0(s)  x}) = 1 − µ(Ak) ≤ 1 − µ(E) = µ({s : x1Ex0(s)  x}) for x1  x  x0,
43x1Akx0  x1Ex0. Similarly, for x1  x  x0, µ({s : x1Ex0(s)  x}) = 1 − µ(E) < 1 =
µ({s : x0(s)  x}), so x1Ex0  x0. Since u(X) is convex and x1  x1 E x0  x0, there exists
x such that x ∼ x1 E x0, and hence x1Akx0  x  x0 for all k ≥ 1: contradiction. Thus,
µ(Ak) ↓ 0, so µ is countably additive.
Let C0 = {Cn}n≥1, C∗ = {C∗
n}n≥1 and {Pn}n≥1 be as in the proof of Theorem 2.6. It is wlog
to assume that S is compact metrizable; since µ is convex-valued, S must be uncountable
It is w.l.o.g. to assume that µ has full support. To elaborate, since µ is countably additive
and µ({s}) = 0 for all s ∈ S because µ is convex-ranged, the Borel Isomorphism theorem for
measures ([20], Theorem 17.41) yields a Borel isomorphism ϕ : S → [0,1] such that µ ◦ ϕ−1
is Lebesgue measure. Arguing as in Subsection 6.5.5 of the Online Appendix, if the plausible
priors determined by the functional I◦ϕ−1 agree with Lebesgue measure, the plausible priors
for I coincide with µ (for an alternative, direct proof, see the Online Appendix, §6.5.7).
It will be shown that Pn = µ for all n ≥ 1. Fix an arbitrary n ≥ 1 and let c be a
critical point of Cn ⊂ C(S) ∩ B1(S,Σ). If c is constant, then Cn = C(S) ∩ B1(S,Σ), i.e.
 is EU; thus, assume c is nonconstant. Recall that c is in the interior of C∗
n, so for some
 > 0, ka − ck < 2 implies a ∈ C∗
n. Deﬁne cmin = mins c(s), cmax = maxs c(s): then
−1 + 2 ≤ cmin < cmax ≤ 1 − 2; ﬁnally, let R = cmax − cmin > 0.
Also, c is the uniform limit of the sequence of step functions {aM}M≥1 deﬁned by aM(s) =
cmin + R
M(m − 1) whenever c(s) ∈ [cmin + R
M(m − 1),cmin + R
Mm) for m = 1,...,M − 1, and
aM(s) = cmin + R
M(M −1) whenever c(s) ∈ [cmin + R
M(M −1),cmax]. For M > R
 , kaM −ck =
R
M <  (hence, aM ∈ C∗
n) and furthermore min{aM(s) − aM(t) : aM(s) > aM(t)} = R
M < .
Fix such a value of M; for simplicity, denote the corresponding step function aM by a,
and let f ∈ L be a simple act such that u ◦ f = a; write f = (x1,E1;...xM,EM), where
u(xm) = cmin + R
M(m − 1). Since µ has full support, µ(Em) > 0 for all m.
Claim 1. For any m ∈ {1,...,M}, Pn(Em) > 0 and Pn(F) =
µ(F)
µ(Em)Pn(Em) for all F ∈ Σ
such that F ⊂ Em.
Proof : Let x ∈ X be such that u(x) = u(xm)+ R
M; note that x = xm+1 if m < M. Deﬁne
the act f0 by f0(s) = f(s) for s 6∈ Em, and f0(s) = x for s ∈ Em. Note that u◦f0 ∈ B1(S,Σ),
and ku ◦ f0 − ak ≤ ku ◦ f0 − u ◦ fk + ku ◦ f − ak < 2, so u ◦ f0 ∈ C∗
n.
Then Def. 3.1 implies that f0  f, because, for x0 such that xm  x0 ≺ x, µ({s : f0(s) 
x0}) = µ(
Sm−1
`=1 E`) < µ(
Sm
`=1 E`) = µ({s : f(s)  x0}), and equality holds for all other x0.
Hence, Pn(u ◦ f0) = I(u ◦ f0) > I(u ◦ f) = Pn(u ◦ f), so Pn(Em) > 0 as needed.





Kµ(Em) for all k = 1,...,K. For each such k, construct acts fk such
that fk(s) = f(s) for all s ∈ S \Ek
m, and fk(s) = x for s ∈ Ek
m, where u(x) = u(xm)+ R
M as
above. Then u ◦ fk ∈ C∗
n; furthermore, Def. 3.1 implies that fk ∼ fh, hence Pn(u ◦ fk) =
44I(u ◦ fk) = I(u ◦ fh) = Pn(u ◦ fh), for all k,h ∈ {1,...,K}. Since fk and fh only diﬀer
on Ek
m and Eh










µ(Em) is irrational, and consider r ∈ Q∩(
µ(F)
µ(Em),1]. By range convexity of µ,
there exists Fr ∈ Σ such that Fr ⊂ Em \ F and
µ(F)+µ(Fr)
µ(Em) = r,44 so Pn(F ∪ Fr) = rPn(Em).
Thus, Pn(F) ≤ rPn(Em) for all r ∈ Q∩(
µ(F)





µ(Em)Pn(Em), so Claim 1 holds for all Borel F ⊂ E.






`=1 E`) for all F ∈ Σ such that
F ⊂
Sm
`=1 E`. Thus, in particular, Pn = µ.
Proof : arguing by induction, the assertion follows from Claim 1 for m = 1; thus, assume
that it holds for m − 1 ≥ 1. Recall that µ(Em−1) > 0 and µ(Em) > 0; since µ is convex-
ranged, there exist events Gm−1 ⊂ Em−1 and Gm ⊂ Em such that µ(Gm−1) = µ(Gm) > 0
[e.g. if µ(Em−1) ≤ µ(Em), let Gm−1 = Em−1 and choose Gm so µ(Gm) = µ(Em−1), which is
possible by range convexity; similarly for µ(Em−1) > µ(Em).]
Now deﬁne an act f0 by f0(s) = f(s) for s ∈ S \ (Gm−1 ∪ Gm), f0(s) = xm for s ∈ Gm−1,
and f0(s) = xm−1 for s ∈ Gm. Note that, by construction, u(xm) − u(xm−1) = R
M < , so
kf0 − ak ≤ kf0 − fk + kf − ak < 2, hence f0 ∈ C∗
n. Furthermore, µ({s : f0(s) = x`}) =
µ({s : f(s) = x`}) for all ` = 1,...,M. This is obvious for ` < m−1 or ` > m; moreover, for
` = m − 1, by the choice of Gm−1 and Gm,
µ({s : f
0(s) = xm−1}) = µ([Em−1 \Gm−1]∪Gm) = µ(Em−1)−µ(Gm−1)+µ(Gm) = µ(Em−1),
and similarly for ` = m. Therefore, f ∼ f0, which implies Pn(u ◦ f) = Pn(u ◦ f0); since f,f0
only diﬀer on Gm−1∪Gm, a simple calculation shows that Pn(Gm) = Pn(Gm−1). By Claim 1,
Pn(Gm) =
µ(Gm)
























































Finally, consider an arbitrary F ⊂
Sm
`=1 E`. Then
Pn(F) = Pn(F ∩
m−1 [
`=1


























44Equivalently, Fr must satisfy µ(Fr) = rµ(Em)−µ(F) ≤ µ(Em)−µ(F) = µ(Em \F); so range convexity
implies that such Fr can be found.
455.3 Proof of Theorem 3.4
5.3.1 Notation and Preliminary results
Let u, C = {Cn}n≥1 and {Pn}n≥1 represent ; similarly, let uE, CE = {CE
k }k≥1 and {P E
k }n≥1
represent E. As in Subsection 5.1.2, let I(a) =
R
adPn for all a ∈ Cn and n ≥ 1, and
similarly let IE(a) =
R
adP E
k for all a ∈ CE
k and k ≥ 1. Recall that I and IE are monotonic,
normalized, c-linear functionals. Finally, assume that u(Y ) ⊃ [−1,1], and deﬁne aEb =
1Ea + 1Ecb for a,b ∈ B(S,Σ).
Note that E ∈ Σ is non-null if and only if, for all a,b ∈ B(S,Σ), a(s) = b(s) for s ∈ S\E
and a(s) > b(s) for all s ∈ E imply I(a) > I(b).
Overview. Lemma 5.14 characterizes non-null events in terms of the plausible priors
{Pn}. Lemma 5.15 examines the “ﬁxpoint condition” discussed after Theorem 3.4.
Lemma 5.14 An event E ∈ Σ is non-null for  if and only if, for all n ≥ 1, Pn(E) > 0.
Proof. Suppose E is non-null and let c ∈ B(S,Σ) lie in the interior of Cn. Then there
exists  > 0 such that the function c0 deﬁned by c0(s) = c(s) for s ∈ S\E and c0(s) = c(s)+






[I(c0) − I(c)] > 0.
Conversely, assume Pn(E) > 0 for all n ≥ 1, and let a,b ∈ B(S,Σ) be such that a(s) =
b(s) for s ∈ S \ E, and a(s) > b(s) for s ∈ E. By Part (3) in Def. 2.5, there exists
γ > 0 such that γa + (1 − γ)b, b ∈ Cn for some n ≥ 1. Since γa(s) + (1 − γ)b(s) = b(s)
for s ∈ S \ E, γa(s) + (1 − γ)b(s) > b(s) for s ∈ E, Pn(E) > 0 and Pn is countably
additive, I(γa + (1 − γ)b) =
R
[γa + (1 − γ)b]dPn >
R
bdPn = I(b). Furthermore, since




[γa+(1−γ)b]dPm for all m ≥ 1; hence,
by c-linearity of I [considering acts f,g such that u ◦ f = αa, u ◦ g = αb for appropriate
α > 0] and Part (iii) of Theorem 2.6, I(a) ≥ I(γa + (1 − γ)b) > I(b).
Lemma 5.15 Suppose that E ∈ Σ is non-null. Then, For every a ∈ B(S,Σ), there exists a
unique solution x ∈ R to the equation
x = I(aEx). (7)
The map J : B(S,Σ) → R associating to each a ∈ B(S,Σ) the unique solution to Eq. (7) is
monotonic, c-linear and normalized.
46Proof. Let x1 = sups∈E a(s), x0 = infs∈E a(s); by monotonicity, I(aEx1) − x1 ≤ 0 and
I(aEx0) − x0 ≥ 0. By norm-continuity, there exists x ∈ [x0,x1] such that x = I(aEx).
Furthermore, suppose there are two such solutions x,x0, with x > x0. Then I(aEx) −
x = I(aEx0) − x0, i.e. I(1E(a − x)) = I(1E(a − x0)) = 0. But this contradicts the fact
that E is non-null, because 1E(s)[a(s) − x] = 1E(s)[a(s) − x0] = 0 for s ∈ S \ E and
1E(s)[a(s) − x] = a(s) − x < a(s) − x0 = 1E(s)[a(s) − x0] for s ∈ E.
Verifying the other properties of J is straightforward, so the proof is omitted.
5.3.2 Necessity of the Axioms
Now turn to the proof of Theorem 3.4. To show that (2) implies (1), consider a non-null
E ∈ Σ and assume that uE = u (clearly w.l.o.g.) and, for all k, P E
k = Pnk(·|E) for some
nk ≥ 1 such that Eq. (3) holds; conditional probabilities are well-deﬁned by Lemma 5.14.
Since Pnk(S \ E|E) = 0 for all k ≥ 1, it is clear that E satisﬁes Axiom 11. It remains to
be shown that ,E jointly satisfy Axiom 12, Dynamic c-Consistency.
Fix an act f ∈ L such that u◦f ∈ CE
k ; then a lottery y ∈ Y satisﬁes f ∼E y, i.e. u(y) = R
u◦f dPnk(·|E), if and only if fEy ∼ y. “Only if”: assume f ∼E y and u◦[fEy] ∈ Cm for
some m ≥ 1; then, by Eq. (3),
R
u ◦ [fEy]dPm =
R
u ◦ f E u(y)dPm = u(y), i.e. fEy ∼ y.
“If”: suppose fEy ∼ y and u ◦ [fEy] ∈ Cm, so u(y) solves the equation I([u ◦ f]Ex) = x; if
f 6∼E y, then f ∼E y0 for some y0 6∼E y. By the “only if” part, assuming u ◦ [fEy0] ∈ Cm0, R
u ◦ [fEy0]dPm0 = u(y0), i.e. I([u ◦ f]Eu(y0)) = u(y0); since u = uE, u(y0) 6= u(y), so there
are two distinct solutions to I(u◦fEx) = x, which contradicts Lemma 5.15. Thus, fEy ∼ y
implies f ∼E y. It follows that f E g iﬀ y  y0, where fEy ∼ y and gEy0 ∼ y0.
Dynamic c-Consistency can now be veriﬁed. Suppose f E y0 and f(s)  y0 for s ∈ Ec;
by Monotonicity of , f  fEy0. Also, if y ∼ fEy, then y  y0; thus, by monotonicity again,
since I(1E[u◦f −u(y)]) = 0, I(1E[u◦f −u(y0)]) ≥ 0, or equivalently I(u◦fEu(y0)) ≥ u(y0),
i.e. fEy0  y0. Thus, f  y0, as needed. If instead f E y0, then y  y0; as above,
I(1E[u◦f −u(y0)]) ≥ 0, but since, by Lemma 5.15, the solution to Eq. (7) is unique, it must
be the case that actually I(1E[u ◦ f − u(y0)]) > 0, or fEy0  y0. Thus, f  y0, as needed.
The cases f E y0 and f ≺E y0 are treated similarly.
5.3.3 Suﬃciency of the Axioms
Turn now to the proof that (1) implies (2). Begin with two preliminary claims.
Claim 1: For all acts f and outcomes y, f E y ⇔ fEy  y and f E y ⇔ fEy  y.
Proof : suppose f E y. By Axiom 11, fEy ∼E f E y. Clearly, fEy(s) ∼ y for all
47s ∈ Ec. Thus, by Axiom 12, fEy  y. If instead f ≺E y, the same argument shows that
fEy ≺ y, which proves the ﬁrst part of the claim. The second is proved similarly.
Claim 2: For all outcomes y,y0, y E y0 ⇔ y  y.
The preceding claim implies that y E y0 iﬀ yEy0  y0; that is, for some n ≥ 1,
u(y)Pn(E) + u(y0)Pn(Ec) ≥ u(y0). Since E is non-null, Pn(E) > 0, so the preceding ex-
pression reduces to u(y) ≥ u(y0). This implies the claim.
Now, by Claim 2, it is wlog to assume uE = u. Also, by Claims 1 and 2, f E g iﬀ y  y0
for all y,y0 such that fEy ∼ y and gEy0 ∼ y0. To see this, note that, by Claim 1, f ∼E y
and g ∼E y0; hence, f E g iﬀ y E y0; by Claim 2, this is equivalent to y  y0, as required.
Thus, the unique, monotonic, c-linear, and normalized ﬁxpoint map J deﬁned in Lemma
5.15 represents E. Hence (cf. Lemma 5.1), for all a ∈ B(S,Σ), J(a) = IE(a) = I(aE IE(a)).
By assumption, IE(a) =
R
adP E
k whenever a ∈ CE
k . It must now be veriﬁed that, for
every k ≥ 1, Eq. (3) holds, and P E
k = Pnk for some nk ≥ 1. Fix k ≥ 1 and consider the set
Dk = {aE I
E(a) : a ∈ C
E
k }.
Dk is convex: if aE IE(a), bE IE(b) ∈ Dk, then a,b,αa+(1−α)b ∈ CE
k ; also, α[aE IE(a)]+
(1 − α)[bE IE(b)] = [αa + (1 − α)b]E [αIE(a) + (1 − α)IE(b)] = [αa + (1 − α)b]E IE(αa +
(1−α)b) ∈ Dk, because IE is aﬃne on CE
k [cf. Lemma 5.9, Part (i) and Lemma 5.4, Part 5.]
Furthermore, consider a0,b0 ∈ Dk, so a0 = aEIE(a), b0 = bEIE(b) for some a,b ∈ CE
k .
Then, for all α ∈ [0,1], I(αa0 + (1 − α)b0) = I([αa + (1 − α)b]E [αIE(a) + (1 − α)IE(b)]) =
I([αa + (1 − α)b]E IE(αa + (1 − α)b)) = IE(αa + (1 − α)b) = αIE(a) + (1 − α)IE(b) =
αI(aEIE(a))+(1−α)I(bEIE(b)) = αI(a0)+(1−α)I(b0). That is, a0 ' b0 for all a0,b0 ∈ Dk.
Now, by Lemma 5.13, there exists nk ≥ 1 such that I(a0) =
R
a0 dPnk for every a0 ∈ Dk;
thus, for every a ∈ CE
k ,
I










adPnk(·|E). Also, for all a ∈ CE
k , if x = IE(a) =
R
adPnk(·|E) and aEx ∈ Cm,
Z





i.e Eq. (3) holds; ﬁnally, since P E
k is the unique measure representing E on CE
k , P E
k =
Pnk(·|E), and the proof of Theorem 3.4 is complete.
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